Washington Law Review
Volume 90
Number 2 Symposium: Campbell at 21
6-1-2015

"The Shameful Wall of Exclusion": How Solitary Confinement for
Inmates with Mental Illness Violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act
Jessica Knowles

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Disability Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jessica Knowles, Notes and Comments, "The Shameful Wall of Exclusion": How Solitary Confinement for
Inmates with Mental Illness Violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 893 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol90/iss2/11

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

15 - Knowles.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/3/2015 1:33 PM

“THE SHAMEFUL WALL OF EXCLUSION” *: HOW
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR INMATES WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS VIOLATES THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Jessica Knowles **
Abstract: Although solitary confinement is conventionally challenged under the “cruel
and unusual” standard of the Eighth Amendment, this approach presents several intractable
legal hurdles to successful claims. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101 et seq., and its precursor, the Rehabilitation Act, provide innovative and nonconstitutional causes of action for inmates with mental illness 1 to challenge their solitary
confinement. It is estimated that at least thirty percent of inmates in solitary confinement are
mentally ill, a high percentage that is due to both the disproportionate number of mentally ill
inmates who are isolated from the general prison population as well as the negative
psychological impacts of this isolation.
Under Title II, Section 12132 of the ADA, prisoners with mental illness cannot “be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” As
recognized by U.S. Supreme Court precedent and interpreted by the Department of Justice,

*

Title taken from President George H.W. Bush’s remarks during the signing of the Americans with
Disabilities Act: “Let the shameful wall of exclusion come tumbling down.” Press Release, The
White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President During Ceremony for the Signing
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990), available at
http://www.archives.gov/research/americans-with-disabilities/transcriptions/naid-6037492-remarksby-the-president-during-ceremony-for-the-signing-of-the-americans-with-disabilities-act-of1990.html.
**
The author previously worked on conditions of incarceration on a Fulbright grant in the
Philippines and as an intern for the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation’s Capitol, the
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, and Columbia Legal Services’ Institutions Project.
1. A note on word choice: this Comment uses “inmates/prisoners with mental illness” and
“mentally ill inmates/prisoners” interchangeably. The latter term may appear to contradict the
conventions of “people-first language,” which encourages placing the person-noun first, e.g.
“person with a mental illness,” to accentuate the humanity and decrease the stigmatizing disability.
See, e.g., John Folkins, Resource on Person-First Language: The Language Used to Describe
Individuals with Disabilities, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N (1992), available at
http://www.asha.org/publications/journals/submissions/person_first.htm;
cf.
Stephen
A.
Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA, Getting Behind No Child Left
Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4 n.14 (2004) (“[T]he verdict is
not yet in whether ‘disabled person’ is acceptable in lieu of a ‘people first’ term like ‘person with a
disability.’ Some crip activists and academics actually choose what might be called ‘disability first’
nomenclature as an act of defiance or pride or as a matter of mere habit.” (internal citations
omitted)). However, because identifying an individual as an inmate can also be considered
stigmatizing, I have chosen to use these descriptors interchangeably.
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the ADA protects mentally ill inmates from discrimination on the basis of their disability.
This Comment will argue that prison facilities discriminate under the ADA when they (1)
isolate mentally ill inmates on the basis of their disability, (2) prolong inmates’ solitary
confinement due to their preexisting or manifesting mental illness, or (3) fail to provide
access to aids, benefits, or services to inmates with mental illness who need to be isolated for
safety reasons.

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Sam Mandez was sentenced to life in prison in Colorado for
a murder he allegedly committed at the age of fourteen. 2 Charged as an
adult, Mandez was convicted after a highly controversial trial. Several
jurors later expressed belief in Mandez’s innocence. 3 Shortly after
beginning his prison sentence, Mandez was placed in solitary
confinement for non-violent, minor violations of the prison rules:
making a three-way phone call and trying to open a locked bathroom
door. 4
When he entered solitary confinement, Mandez was by all accounts a
mentally healthy nineteen-year-old. 5 Today, after sixteen years in
isolation, he has been variously diagnosed with schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, and major depressive disorder with psychotic
features. 6 He hears a female voice that tells him to hurt himself. 7 He
believes that he joined the Green Berets at the age of twelve. 8 He has
lost twenty percent of his body weight and attempted suicide three
times. 9 Even though isolation clearly contributed to Mandez’s mental
deterioration, 10 he remained in solitary confinement for over a decade
and a half because his release was contingent on “program compliance”

2. Andrew Cohen, Half a Life in Solitary: How Colorado Made a Young Man Insane, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/11/half-alife-in-solitary-how-colorado-made-a-young-man-insane/281306/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU) OF COLO., OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND: COLORADO’S
CONTINUED WAREHOUSING OF MENTALLY ILL PRISONERS IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 7 (2013)
[hereinafter ACLU OF COLORADO] (describing Sam Mandez’s case under the pseudonym John
Quinn).
6. Cohen, supra note 2.
7. ACLU OF COLORADO, supra note 5, at 8.
8. Cohen, supra note 2.
9. ACLU OF COLORADO, supra note 5, at 8.
10. See ACLU of Colo., Out of Sight, Out of Mind—The Story of Sam Mandez, VIMEO (2013),
http://vimeo.com/78840078 (includes an interview at 10:55 with Dr. Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist
who evaluated Sam Mandez’s case, who states: “This is a human rights abuse on the face of it.
We’ve actually created the mental illness.”).
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and “appropriate behavior.” 11 Because Mandez’s mental illness
prevented him from conforming his behavior, he continued to be trapped
in a vicious cycle that he could not escape. 12
Sam Mandez’s experience is not unique. The United States
incarcerates more prisoners in solitary confinement than any other
country in the world—an estimated 80,000 prisoners nationwide. 13 This
extreme form of isolation often lasts for years and sometimes decades.14
In Texas and California, which have the largest prison populations in the
country, 15 the average solitary confinement terms are roughly four and
seven years, respectively. 16 By contrast, the United Kingdom confines
just 500 prisoners in isolation, and only for limited periods of time. 17
11. Cohen, supra note 2 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
12. Mandez was eventually released from solitary confinement (or “administrative segregation,”
or “ad seg”) in 2013, ostensibly due to the efforts of his attorneys at the ACLU of Colorado. He has
since been moved to a “residential treatment program” within the correctional system, which his
attorney, Rebecca Wallace, describes as “ad seg by another name.” However, due to recent
legislative changes in Colorado as well as reformist leadership at the Colorado Department of
Corrections, Mandez is now allowed twenty hours of out-of-cell time a week and is receiving
treatment. Despite these advancements, Mandez remains severely mentally ill, which his attorneys
attribute to the many years he spent in solitary confinement. See E-mail from Rebecca Wallace,
Staff Attorney at the ACLU of Colo. (Feb. 19, 2015, 12:49 PST) (on file with Washington Law
Review).
13. ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, ACLU BRIEFING PAPER: THE DANGEROUS OVERUSE OF
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Stephanie Chen, ‘Terrible Tommy’ Spends 27 Years in Solitary Confinement, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/25/colorado.supermax.silverstein.solitary/ (last visited Apr.
20, 2015); Elaine Woo, Herman Wallace Dies at 71; Ex-Inmate Held in Solitary for 41 Years, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/08/local/la-me-herman-wallace20131009.
15. E. ANNE CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2013, at 4 (2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.
16. FAQ, SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN, http://solitarywatch.com/
facts/faq/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (listing the average solitary confinement terms in Texas as
“more than 4 years” and in California as 6.8 years).
17. The United Kingdom utilizes several forms of isolation for various reasons, including
discipline and protection. See generally U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PRISON SERVICE ORDER 1700,
at 16 (Jul. 31, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/psos (labeled “1700 –
segregation (Zip 3mb)”) [hereinafter PRISON SERVICE ORDER 1700]. If an adult inmate over the age
of twenty-one is found guilty of an offense, they can be placed in “cellular confinement” for up to
twenty-one days. “Young adults,” defined as those inmates between the ages of eighteen and
twenty, can only be segregated for a maximum of ten days. Id. at 21; see also Young Adult
Offenders, JUST. (Feb. 25, 2012), https://www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/types-of-offender/youngadult-offenders. Youth under the age of eighteen are not subject to solitary confinement. PRISON
SERVICE ORDER 1700, supra, at 21. “Violent or refractory” prisoners can also be isolated in “special
accommodation” for safety—not punitive—purposes. Id. at 44. With this form of isolation, “[e]very
effort must be made to keep the time a prisoner is held in Special Accommodation to a minimum,
i.e. minutes rather than hours or days.” Id. at 47; see also Elisa Mosler, Solitary Confinement in
Great Britain: Still Harsh, But Rare, SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN LOCKDOWN
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The United States also imprisons a disproportionate number of mentally
ill inmates in solitary confinement, also known as the “SHU” (security
housing unit) or the “hole.” 18 In New York State, for example, nearly
one-third of the prisoners in solitary confinement have been diagnosed
with either schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. 19 Remarkably, the average
solitary confinement sentence for New York inmates with mental illness
is also six times longer than that of the general inmate population. 20
The reasons why mentally ill inmates are disproportionately held in
isolation are threefold. First, those prisoners with preexisting mental
illness may find it difficult to conform to prison regulations. 21 They are
therefore disparately placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary
purposes or administrative reasons. 22 Second, many prisoners who are
placed in solitary confinement develop severe mental illness as a result
of the extreme isolation. 23 This latter scenario is most likely what
happened to Sam Mandez. As Dr. Terry Kupers, one of the foremost
psychologists on the impact of solitary confinement on mental health,
explained: “I am often asked whether prisoners with serious mental
illness are selectively sent to punitive segregation, or whether the harsh
conditions of isolation and idleness cause psychiatric decompensation in
a vulnerable sub-population of prisoners. Of course, both mechanisms
are in play.” 24 Third and lastly, mentally ill prisoners in isolation are
more likely to violate prison rules, and fail the requirements of so-called
“step-down” programs, thus prolonging their solitary sentences. 25 The
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/01/19/solitary-confinement-in-great-britain-stillharsh-but-rare/ (noting that adult inmates may only be held in punitive segregation for a maximum
of twenty-one days, and that in practice many are only placed in isolation for a matter of hours).
18. See ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2 (listing the various terms used for
solitary confinement).
19. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 147 (2003).
20. Id. at 147–48.
21. Id. at 147.
22. Id. at 145–47.
23. Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Psychology and Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 4, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (No. 04-495), 2005 WL
539137, at *4 (noting that “[n]o study of the effects of solitary or supermax-like confinement that
lasted longer than 60 days failed to find evidence of negative psychological effects”).
24. Terry A. Kupers, How to Create Madness in Prison, in HUMANE PRISONS 53 (David Jones
ed., 2006).
25. See, e.g., HOPE METCALF ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION, DEGREES OF ISOLATION,
AND INCARCERATION: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL POLICIES
18 (2013) (“Commonly referred to as ‘Step-Down,’ ‘Intensive Management,’ or ‘Behavioral
Management’ programs, these systems tie an inmate’s departure from segregation to the completion
of certain goals, such as behavioral plans or classes. . . . Some systems explicitly state that
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confluence of these three factors has led to high rates of mentally ill
inmates being confined in isolation. 26
Legal challenges to prison conditions—including lawsuits challenging
solitary confinement for the mentally ill—have traditionally been
brought under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and
unusual punishment.” 27 However, constitutional protections have done
little to prevent the proliferation of solitary confinement.28 Although the
Supreme Court has yet to directly address whether long-term solitary
confinement violates the Eighth Amendment, most federal courts that
have considered the issue have held that indefinite isolation is not cruel
and unusual. 29
Due to the lack of constitutional protections, some prisoners and their
advocates have turned to statutory alternatives, including the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its precursor, the Rehabilitation Act
(collectively referred to in this Comment as the disability rights statutes)
to seek relief. 30 For years, district courts dismissed these claims. 31
However, in 2013 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) made headlines
when it found that the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at
Cresson had violated the ADA by segregating mentally ill prisoners in
solitary confinement. 32 Because the DOJ is tasked with enforcing Title II
disciplinary infractions, of any kind, can extend the length [of] time in segregation.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Hearing on Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights,
Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Human Rights, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7 (2014) (written testimony of Professor
Laura Rovner, University of Denver Sturm College of Law) (describing how inmates with mental
illness at the Colorado Department of Corrections must meet certain program requirements in order
to be removed from solitary confinement, but “cannot progress in [a] linear fashion through the
levels of the program precisely because of their mental disabilities”). Professor Rovner’s written
testimony also noted that the former program for mentally ill inmates had a sixty-one percent failure
rate. Id.
26. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 19, at 147, 149.
27. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Brittany Glidden & Laura Rovner, Requiring the State to
Justify Supermax Confinement for Mentally Ill Prisoners: A Disability Discrimination Approach, 90
DENV. U. L. REV. 55, 55 (2012).
28. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness,
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2012) (describing the increase in the use of solitary confinement
beginning in the 1990s as described by the Human Rights Watch).
29. Id. at 18 n.90 (internal citations omitted).
30. See, e.g., Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27.
31. See, e.g., Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F. App’x 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2008); Norris v.
Marrero, No. 5:14-234-DCR, 2014 WL 7366224, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 24, 2014); Goins v. Beard,
No. 09-1223, 2011 WL 4345874, at *11–12 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2011); Atkins v. Cnty. of Orange,
251 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
32. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & David J.
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of the ADA, 33 this finding was groundbreaking in the field of prison
reform litigation, and several claims have since been filed on the basis of
this legal theory. 34 However, there are currently few, if any successful
cases on record, and it remains to be seen how influential the DOJ’s
recent interpretation of the ADA in the solitary confinement context will
be to courts. 35
This Comment will explore the viability of this new and potentially
powerful interpretation of the disability rights statutes and weigh its
relative strengths and weaknesses against traditional Eighth Amendment
claims. Additionally, this Comment will argue that prison facilities
discriminate under the ADA when they (1) isolate mentally ill inmates
on the basis of their disability; (2) prolong the isolation of inmates due to
their mental decomposition in solitary confinement; and (3) fail to
provide equal access to aids, benefits, and services to mentally ill
inmates who need to be isolated due to safety considerations.
This argument will be advanced in several parts. Part I provides a
brief background of the history of solitary confinement, the medical
literature confirming the causal relationship between solitary
confinement and mental illness, and the barriers to a successful Eighth
Amendment challenge to solitary confinement. Part II describes the
elements of a successful ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, details the
potential advantages and drawbacks of this approach, and provides a
summary of recent and pending litigation. Part III proposes that future
test cases should challenge the segregation of mentally ill prisoners and
their prolonged isolation as violations of the disability rights statutes.
Part III also argues that these cases should also challenge correctional
facilities’ failure to provide reasonable modifications or equal access to
aids, benefits, or services to inmates isolated for valid safety reasons.

Hickton, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, to Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa. (May 31, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cresson_findings_5-31-13.pdf.
33. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.172–35.174 (2014).
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. See Elizabeth Alexander, “This Experiment, So Fatal”: Some Initial Thoughts on Strategic
Choices in the Campaign Against Solitary Confinement, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 39 (2015)
(“Because of the resources and institutional prestige of the Department of Justice, if the Department
pursues the potential litigation outlined in the [Cresson findings letters], that litigation could
produce a potential breakthrough in the use of the ADA to protect prisoners from solitary
confinement.”).
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SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND THE
LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

Inmates in solitary confinement are typically housed in small cells for
twenty-two to twenty-four hours a day with very limited or no access to
human contact, the outdoors, or educational resources. 36 Many of these
cells are windowless, 37 with around-the-clock florescent lighting, 38 a
poured concrete bed, and steel door. 39 Inmates are allowed out of their
cells for only one or two hours a day for showers or recreation. 40 Such
recreation time is spent either alone in an empty cell or in an encaged
enclosure. 41 Solitary confinement cells have been labeled “prisons
within prisons.” 42
Solitary confinement is primarily utilized for disciplinary reasons
(“disciplinary segregation”), which lasts for a set period of time, or for
self-protection (“administrative segregation”), which can be indefinite. 43

36. See ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2.
37. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 19, at 146.
38. See, e.g., Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing the
lighting conditions in administrative segregation unit at the Airway Heights Corrections Center in
Washington State); Brandon Keim, The Horrible Psychology of Solitary Confinement, WIRED (Jul.
10, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/07/solitary-confinement-2/ (describing solitary
confinement in “bathroom-sized cells, under fluorescent lights that never shut off”).
39. See, e.g., Hearing on Reassessing Solitary Confinement II, supra note 25, at 3 (describing the
cell conditions at the federal supermax prison, the ADX, in Florence, Colorado); Tessa Murphy,
Solitary Confinement is Cruel and All Too Usual. Why Is It Only Getting Worse?, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 13, 2014, 8:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/13/solitaryconfinement-us-prisoners-rehabilitation (describing solitary confinement at the Pelican Bay Prison
in California as a “small, dark cell, surrounded by nothing but three concrete walls, a dank toilet, a
small sink, a thin mattress, a concrete slab and a perforated metal door that barely let any air in”).
40. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S.
Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 104 (2010);
Joseph Neff, UNC Study: Solitary Confinement Too Common, Ineffective, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/11/08/4306250/unc-study-solitary-confinement.html
(describing solitary confinement conditions in North Carolina, where “[i]nmates generally leave
their cells, shackled and accompanied by guards, for one hour at a time several days a week for
recreation or showers”).
41. See Metzner & Fellner, supra note 40, at 104.
42. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 19, at 145; SOLITARY WATCH, supra
note 16. Although this Comment primarily addresses the practice of solitary confinement within the
prison context, solitary confinement is practiced within jails (pre-trial detention facilities), juvenile
detention facilities, and immigration detention centers. See, e.g., Ian M. Kysel, Op-Ed., End Solitary
for Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014, at A31; Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held
in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, at A1.
43. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED supra note 19, at 145–46, 153; ACLU
NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 13, at 3; METCALF ET AL., supra note 25, at 1 (summarizing the
administrative segregation policies of forty-eight state correctional systems).

15 - Knowles.docx (Do Not Delete)

900

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6/3/2015 1:33 PM

[Vol. 90:893

Placement in solitary is not connected to the inmates’ original conviction
or sentence. 44 Rather, it is entirely within the discretion of the prison
administration. 45 The length of time an inmate spends in solitary
depends on the facility and the reasons for segregation—it can last from
days to months to years to decades. 46
As detailed in this section, solitary confinement has long been known
to contribute to the mental deterioration of inmates and fell out of use by
the late nineteenth century. 47 However, solitary confinement experienced
a revival in the 1980s and 1990s, when it became a nation-wide practice
to isolate prisoners for the purposes of punishment and protection. 48 This
section will also describe how, despite persisting evidence that
prolonged isolation negatively impacts the mental health of inmates,49
courts have routinely found that its use does not violate the Eighth

44. Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons
and Its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).
45. See, e.g., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN: THE TRUE COST OF EXTREME ISOLATION
IN NEW YORK’S PRISONS 2 (2012) (finding that “[c]orrections officials have enormous discretion to
impose extreme isolation as a disciplinary sanction”); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen balancing the obligation to provide for inmate and staff safety against the duty
to accord inmates the rights and privileges to which they are entitled, prison officials are afforded
‘wide-ranging deference.’”); Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Prison
authorities must be given considerable latitude in the design of measures for controlling homicidal
maniacs without exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary for security.”).
46. ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2; SOLITARY WATCH, supra note 16.
47. Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History
and Review of the Literature, 43 CRIME & JUST. 441, 465 (2006).
48. See, e.g., Sarah Childress & Michelle Mizner, “Lock It Down”: How Solitary Started in the
U.S., PBS (Apr. 22, 2014, 9:43 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/
locked-up-in-america/lock-it-down-how-solitary-started-in-the-u-s/; Lance Tapley, Bonnie Kerness:
Pioneer in the Struggle Against Solitary Confinement, SOLITARY WATCH: NEWS FROM A NATION IN
LOCKDOWN (Nov. 8, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/11/08/bonnie-kerness-pioneer-in-thestruggle-against-solitary-confinement/.
49. See Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1450, 1451–56 (1983) (describing the psychological impact of solitary confinement on
fifteen inmates at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole); Craig Haney & Mona
Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 530 (1997) (“[D]istinctive patterns of
negative effects have emerged clearly, consistently, and unequivocally from personal accounts,
descriptive studies, and systematic research on solitary and punitive segregation. The studies
included in this review span a period of over three decades and were conducted in locations across
several continents by researchers ranging from psychiatrists to sociologists to architects.”); Fatos
Kaba et al., Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, 104 AM. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH 442, 445–46 (2014) (demonstrating a correlation between solitary confinement and selfharm in the New York City jail system); Smith, supra note 47, at 488–93 (collecting historically,
geographically, and methodologically diverse studies on the psychological impact of solitary
confinement).

15 - Knowles.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

6/3/2015 1:33 PM

THE SHAMEFUL WALL OF EXCLUSION

901

Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.” 50
A.

A Brief History of Solitary Confinement

Quakers in Pennsylvania first introduced solitary confinement in the
United States in the late 1700s as a social “experiment[].”51 The practice
was intended to be a humane alternative to the physical and capital
punishment that was a common feature of criminal justice at the time. 52
Quakers believed that prolonged periods of “separation and silence”
would allow prisoners to reflect upon their relationship with God, and
that this would promote rehabilitation.53
However, it quickly became clear that solitary confinement had the
opposite effect. The implementation of solitary confinement at an
Auburn, New York prison created “results so dire” that the governor set
free all the “survivors” after only eighteen months. 54 Alexis de
Tocqueville, the French historian and political scientist, visited solitary
confinement cells in the United States and concluded that this form of
incarceration “devours the victim incessantly and unmercifully; it does
not reform, it kills.” 55 British author Charles Dickens, who was horrified
by the solitary confinement cells he encountered at Philadelphia’s
Cherry Hill Prison, believed solitary confinement “to be immeasurably
worse than any torture of the body.” 56 Around the same time period,
some prison officials even began claiming that the lash was more
humane than solitary confinement. 57 By the 1880s, solitary confinement
had fallen out of favor and was largely abandoned as a penological

50. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rosemeyer, 199 F. App’x 195, 198 (3d Cir. 2006); Scarver v. Litscher,
434 F.3d 972, 975–77 (7th Cir. 2006); Hill v. Pugh, 75 F. App’x 715, 720–21 (10th Cir. 2003);
Merchant v. Hawk-Sawyer, 37 F. App’x 143, 145 (6th Cir. 2002); Moore v. Schuetzle, 486 F. Supp.
2d 969, 983 (D.N.D. 2007), aff’d as modified, 289 F. App’x 962 (8th Cir. 2008).
51. Jennifer Graber, “When Friends Had the Management It Was Entirely Different”: Quakers
and Calvinists in the Making of New York Prison Discipline, 97 QUAKER HIST. 19, 21 (2008).
52. Id. at 19, 30.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Smith, supra note 47, at 457 (quoting Albert G. Hess, Foreward to REPORTS OF THE PRISON
DISCIPLINE SOCIETY OF BOSTON: THE TWENTY-NINE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF
MANAGERS 1826–1854 WITH A MEMOIR OF LOUIS DWIGHT xiv (1972)).
55. Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
115, 118 (2008) (quoting TORSTEN ERIKSSON, THE REFORMERS, AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF
PIONEER EXPERIMENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS 49 (1976) (quoting DU SYSTEME
PENITENTIAIRE AUX ETATS-UNIS ET DE SON APPLICATION EN FRANCE (1833))).
56. See Smith, supra note 47, at 460 (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES 146 (1985)).
57. See Graber, supra note 51, at 27.
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measure. 58
In 1890, the U.S. Supreme Court detailed the horrifying history of
solitary confinement in the decision In re Medley. 59 James Medley, the
petitioner, challenged a Colorado statute requiring solitary confinement
prior to execution. 60 The Court ruled in his favor, finding that solitary
confinement was “an additional punishment of the most important and
painful character” 61 and therefore a violation of the Constitution’s Ex
Post Facto Clause. 62 In support of this finding, the Court noted that
solitary confinement “has a very interesting history of its own,” and
went on to describe the solitary confinement conditions at the Walnut
Street Penitentiary in Philadelphia in 1787 and similar prisons in
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Maryland. 63 The Court recounted that
isolated prisoners fell into a
semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to
arouse them, and others became violently insane; others, still,
committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were
not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
community. 64
The Court also recognized that the practice of solitary confinement
had been generally regarded as “too severe” some “thirty or forty years
ago.” 65
Although solitary confinement had fallen out of favor by the late
1800s, 66 a single event in 1983 revived the use of solitary confinement in
the modern era: the murder of two prison guards at Marion Federal
Prison in Marion, Illinois. 67 Following this incident, the entire prison
was placed in lock-down for nearly twenty-four hours a day in what
became known as the “Marion [M]odel.” 68 Norman Carlson, the director
58. See Smith, supra note 47, at 465.
59. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
60. Id. at 162, 164.
61. Id. at 171.
62. Id. at 171–72; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
63. In re Medley, 134 U.S. at 167–68.
64. Id. at 168.
65. Id.
66. See id.; Lobel, supra note 55, at 118.
67. See, e.g., Childress & Mizner, supra note 48; Justin Peters, How a 1983 Murder Created
America’s Terrible Supermax-Prison Culture, SLATE (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:56 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/10/23/marion_prison_lockdown_thomas_silverstein_how_a
_1983_murder_created_america.html.
68. Childress & Mizner, supra note 48.
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of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at the time, justified the lock-downs,
stating that “[t]here is no way to control a very small subset of the
inmate population who show absolutely no concern for human life.” 69
The “Marion Model” inspired the construction of the first “supermax”
(super-maximum security) prison in 1994 in Florence, Colorado. 70
Supermax prisons are individual facilities, or sections of other facilities,
that are generally designed for indefinite solitary confinement and
minimal contact with guards or other prisoners. 71 Today there are an
estimated 25,000 prisoners housed in supermax prisons across forty-four
states. 72
This increase in the use of solitary confinement also coincided with
the nationwide deinstitutionalization of mental health services and an
uptick in mass incarceration. 73 The deinstitutionalization movement
began in the 1960s with the aim of relocating the treatment of
individuals with mental illness from mental health hospitals to
community services. 74 These community health centers were intended to
be less restrictive and more humane than hospitals. 75 As a result of
deinstitutionalization, the number of mental health patients in hospitals
dropped dramatically, from 559,000 patients in 1955 to 132,000 in
1980. 76 Unfortunately, the community mental health services slated to
take on the influx of individuals with mental illness were both
underprepared and underfunded to adequately provide services to these
individuals. 77 Set adrift in their communities without sufficient mental
69. Michael Taylor, The Last Worst Place / The Isolation at Colorado’s ADX Prison Is Brutal
Beyond Compare. So Are the Inmates, SFGATE (Dec. 28, 1998, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/
default/article/The-Last-Worst-Place-The-isolation-at-2970596.php#page-1.
70. Gertrude Strassburger, Judicial Inaction and Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Are SuperMaximum Walls Too High for the Eighth Amendment?, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 199,
202–03 (2001).
71. DANIEL P. MEARS, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
SUPERMAX PRISONS, at ii (2006).
72. See ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 13, at 1.
73. See, e.g., Childress & Mizner, supra note 48 (noting that the “modern use of solitary
confinement in American prisons began” in 1983); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass
Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 53, 58 (2011) (demonstrating that the drop in the rate of deinstitutionalization of mental
hospitals coincided with a rise in the rate of incarceration in the late 1970s).
74. Jonathan P. Bach, Note, Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalization:
Toward a Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 1153, 1155–56
(1989).
75. Id. at 1153, 1155.
76. Id. at 1155–56.
77. Mark R. Pogrebin & Eric D. Poole, Deinstitutionalization and Increased Arrest Rates Among
the Mentally Disordered, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 117, 121 (1987).
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health services, many individuals with mental illness came into contact
with the criminal justice system. 78 Arrest and incarceration, as opposed
to treatment referral, was often the default response from law
enforcement. 79 As a result, “the jail has assumed the role of delivering
psychiatric services to poor, mentally disturbed offenders.” 80
Contemporaneous with this movement toward deinstitutionalization was
the resurgence of solitary confinement as a means to control prison
populations. 81
There are two primary justifications for the proliferation of solitary
confinement and supermax facilities: (1) that isolating certain inmates
disrupts organized criminal activity—including gang activity 82 and
terrorism83—between prison facilities and the public, and (2) that
segregating the most dangerous inmates from the general prison
population makes prisons safer. 84 However, studies on prison violence in
Arizona, Illinois, and Minnesota indicate that opening of supermax
prisons in those states has not decreased inmate-on-inmate violence in
the general population facilities. 85 In California, levels of prison violence
have actually increased since supermax prisons were opened to house
the State’s most violent inmates. 86 Accordingly, researchers have labeled
the causal relationship between the use of solitary confinement and
increased prison safety to be “largely speculative.” 87 In fact, reducing
the use of solitary confinement may actually lead to increased safety in
prisons. 88 In Mississippi, a reduction in the use of solitary confinement

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 118–20.
Id. at 119–20.
Id. at 122.
See, e.g., Childress & Mizner, supra note 48.
STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECURITY THREAT GROUP PREVENTION,
IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 5 (2012) (“Criminal gangs are largely responsible
for criminal activities within the institutions, to include the trafficking of narcotics, committing
and/or directing violence against staff and offenders, and directing criminal activity between the
correctional institutions and the community.”).
83. See Lobel, supra note 55, at 131 (“[P]rison officials claim that certain gang members or
leaders, prisoners who engage in violence against other prisoners, or terrorists cannot be housed in
less restrictive conditions because of the danger they pose to other prisoners or prison personnel, or
because they will be in communication with their violent associates outside of prison.”).
84. See Smith, supra note 47, at 443.
85. See ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 13, at 6.
86. Id.
87. See Smith, supra note 47, at 443 (quoting Chad. S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum
Security Prisons on Aggregate Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1371
(2003)).
88. Erica Goode, Rethinking Solitary Confinement: States Ease Isolation, Saving Money, Lives
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led to such a decrease in prison violence that the state’s super-maximum
security unit was shut down. 89 The Mississippi model included a “stepdown unit,” where prisoners with serious mental illness were allowed
access to out-of-cell time, group therapy, and peer counseling for three
to six months before being introduced back into the general prison
population. 90 This model resulted in an almost seventy percent drop in
prisoner-on-staff and prisoner-on-prisoner incidents. 91 The staff’s use of
force, including spraying inmates with immobilizing gas and physical
“takedowns,” also sharply declined. 92 Virginia has instituted a similar
program, and has consequently been able to decrease the number of
inmates in solitary confinement by sixty-two percent. 93
Although Mississippi and Virginia have created “step-down”
programs to reintegrate inmates in solitary confinement into the general
prison population, several states release inmates directly from solitary
confinement onto the street. 94 Some inmates who are released directly
from long-term solitary confinement into the community immediately
commit violent felonies. 95 In one particularly shocking case, a Colorado
inmate newly released from solitary confinement onto the street killed
two people in short succession, including the reform-minded Executive
Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Tom Clements. 96
The inmate, who had spent nearly six years in solitary and exhibited
signs of mental illness, forced his first victim to record him delivering a
rambling message denouncing the use of isolation in prisons. 97 This
and Inmate Sanity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at A1.
89. Id.
90. Terry A. Kupers et al., Beyond Supermax Administrative Segregation: Mississippi’s
Experience Rethinking Prison Classification and Creating Alternative Mental Health Programs, 36
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1037, 1042–43 (2009).
91. Id. at 1043.
92. Id. at 1043–44.
93. See, e.g., Virginia Takes a Stand Against Solitary Confinement, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/virginia-takes-a-stand-against-solitaryconfinement/2013/09/11/68903520-1733-11e3-804b-d3a1a3a18f2c_story.html.
94. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY
CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA 120–22, 121 n.164 (1997) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD
STORAGE] (describing the release of prisoners from solitary confinement in Indiana and California
into the general public).
95. Id. at 121 n.164 (citing anecdotal evidence of “at least a half-dozen cases of inmates released
from the Pelican Bay SHU [in California] who promptly committed murder or other serious
felonies” (internal citations omitted)).
96. Rick Raemisch, Op-Ed., My Night in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2014, at A25.
97. Sadie Gurman, Evan Ebel Forced Pizza Driver to Make Recording Before His Murder,
DENV. POST (Feb. 10, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_25106855/evan-ebelforced-pizza-driver-make-recording-before.
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suggests that, without a step-down program to ease their transition into
the general prison population or the public at large, some inmates may
emerge from solitary confinement more violent than they were before. 98
As described by Dr. Stuart Grassian, a psychiatrist who has evaluated
the impact of super-maximum solitary confinement, “[i]magine taking a
dog that has bitten someone, and kicking and beating and abusing it in a
cage for a year. Then you take that cage and you put it in the middle of a
city, open it and hightail it out of there. That’s what you’re doing.” 99
Ultimately, the successes in Mississippi and Virginia and the tragedies in
Colorado and elsewhere suggest that the widespread use of solitary
confinement may not ultimately promote prison security or ensure the
safety of the community.
B.

The Connection Between Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness
[The prisoner] stood at the window rocking and staring. His
room was incredibly foul, reeking of feces and garbage. There
was blood everywhere on the window. He had cut his hand on
the edge of the window the day before and was rubbing his hand
on the window again. He generally was not responsive to
questions, instead just stared at his hand. 100
—Dr. Dennis Koson describing a mentally ill inmate in
administrative confinement at the Eastern Jersey State
Penitentiary

Contemporary research has conclusively demonstrated that prolonged
solitary confinement can be extremely detrimental to mental health.101
Although isolation affects individuals differently, 102 empirical studies
98. Tim Molloy, New York City Ends Solitary Confinement for Minors, PBS (Dec. 19, 2014, 4:51
PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/stickup-kid/new-york-city-ends-solitaryconfinement-for-minors/ (describing a documentary that “featured prisoners who complained that
isolation was making them more violent and aggressive”).
99. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE, supra note 94, at 121.
100. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 19, at 148 (internal citations omitted).
101. See Grassian, supra note 49, at 1451–54; Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary
Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 333–38, 343–54 (2006); Haney & Lynch, supra note
49, at 496–539; Kaba, supra note 49, at 445–46.
102. Significant factors that vary the impact of solitary confinement include the severity of
sensory deprivation, the length of time in isolation, and perceptions about the intent of the isolation.
See Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, Effects of Sensory Deprivation in Psychiatric Seclusion and
Solitary Confinement, 8 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 49, 61–62 (1985). At least one study has
indicated that solitary can be beneficial for some inmates. See Maureen L. O’Keefe et al., A
Longitudinal Study of Administrative Segregation, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 49, 56–59
(2013). However, the broader significance of this study has been questioned, as the conditions
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show that solitary confinement is linked to suicidal thoughts, impaired
concentration, confusion, depression, anxiety, paranoia, and
hallucinations. 103 It is estimated that around thirty percent of the inmates
in solitary are mentally ill. 104 This high percentage is due both to the
disproportionate number of mentally ill inmates who are placed in
disciplinary and administrative segregation, as well as the negative
psychological impact of isolation. 105 Additionally, this negative
psychological impact makes it difficult for inmates to comply with the
requirements that would allow them to “earn” their way out of
isolation. 106
Prolonged isolation is thought to aggravate pre-existing mental illness
and foster mental illness in healthy individuals because it removes
opportunities for “social reality testing.” 107 In society, individuals
receive constant feedback from social interaction that enables them to
assess their perceptions of reality. 108 The prolonged absence of this
feedback in solitary leads to so-called “SHU [security/special housing
unit] syndrome,” 109 which is characterized by anxiety, disorientation,
violent thoughts, paranoia, lack of impulse control, derealization, and
hallucinations. 110 In at least one study, these symptoms disappeared after
inmates were released from solitary confinement. 111

studied were not representative of solitary confinement nationwide. See Robert H. Berger et al.,
Commentary: Toward an Improved Understanding of Administrative Segregation, 41 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 61, 62–63 (2013).
103. See Smith, supra note 47, at 488–93.
104. See ACLU NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 13, at 6 (internal citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., Kupers, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101, 1103 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (describing
how “[s]eriously mentally ill inmates have difficulty following the rules necessary to advance up the
level system [to be released from solitary confinement]” and referring to plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Terry
Kupers’ testimony that “seriously mentally ill inmates are not capable of following the rules
necessary to earn their way out of the most restrictive status”); Hearing on Reassessing Solitary
Confinement II, supra note 25, at 7.
107. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects of Solitary
Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and Recommending What
Should Change, 52 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 622, 627 (2007) (citing
1993 and 2006 studies by Professor Craig Haney, an expert witness for the plaintiff class in the
Madrid v. Gomez litigation, discussed infra notes 149–152 and accompanying text).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 628–29.
110. Grassian, supra note 49, at 1452–53.
111. Id. at 1453 (“The legal statute in Massachusetts requires relief from isolation status with
closed solid steel doors for at least 24 hours each 15 days. . . . All prisoners interviewed reported a
very rapid (usually within the first few hours) diminution of their symptoms during periods of relief.
No correlation was apparent between severity of symptoms and the time required for them to
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Prolonged solitary confinement, and the resultant mental illnesses,
increase the risk of self-harm and suicide. A recent study of New York
inmates who served time in solitary confinement showed that these
inmates were seven times more likely to harm themselves than those
who did not serve time in isolation. 112 Paradoxically, attempted or
successful self-harm by prisoners in solitary confinement often results in
additional isolation and, sometimes, disciplinary actions. 113 In one
example, a schizophrenic female inmate in the Northern State Prison
segregation unit in Newark, New Jersey self-mutilated and attempted
suicide over a dozen times in isolation. 114 However, instead of treatment,
she was sentenced to additional disciplinary and administrative
segregation. 115 Unsurprisingly, rates of suicide are extremely high
among prisoners in solitary confinement. 116 One study found that sixtyeight percent of prison suicides were committed by inmates in
isolation. 117
Treatment options for mentally ill inmates in isolation are limited,
further compounding the psychological impacts. 118 Psychotropic
medications are usually less effective for those individuals in
confinement, and access to medical health care professionals is
restricted. 119 Moreover, the lack of privacy in segregation units also
thwarts treatment, and psychiatrists must talk to their patients through
cell doors. 120 There are usually no options for rehabilitation programs or
group therapies in isolation units. 121 According to Dr. Kupers, “we seem
to have reproduced some of the worst aspects of an earlier époque’s
snake pit mental asylums in the isolation units of our modern
prisons.” 122

subside.”).
112. See Kaba et al., supra note 49, at 445.
113. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 19, at 187.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 179.
117. Id.
118. See Kupers, supra note 24, at 12.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 13.
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The Eighth Amendment’s Inadequate Protections

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 123 Although history and
medical research have conclusively demonstrated that solitary
confinement can have severe psychological consequences, most courts
have found that prolonged solitary confinement is not cruel and
unusual. 124 This is in part because prisoners are required to overcome
many financial and legal barriers—including statutory directives as well
as judge-made law—in order to successfully challenge their isolation. 125
These substantial hurdles include the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) of 1995, 126 which was intended to reduce frivolous lawsuits by
prisoners but has instead blocked many potentially valid constitutional
claims from ever being decided on the merits.127 The courts’ deference
to prison officials’ offerings of “legitimate penological interests”128 and
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
124. See, e.g., Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 18.
125. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012) (requiring that in forma pauperis prisoners pay the full
filing fee for civil actions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) (requiring that prisoners exhaust their
administrative remedies before bringing an action to challenge prison conditions); id. § 1997e(d)
(limiting the recoupment of attorney’s fees for all prisoner plaintiffs); id. § 1997e(e) (prohibiting
civil suits by prisoners for “mental or emotional injury while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994) (the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” is not violated unless the defendant acted, at a
minimum, with “deliberate indifference”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (prison
regulations may burden prisoners’ constitutional rights for the purposes of “legitimate penological
objectives”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (government officials are protected
from liability for constitutional violations if the requirements for qualified immunity are met).
126. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 66–77
(1996) (codified throughout Titles 18, 28, & 42 of the United States Code). The Act’s official title is
“The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,” but it was not enacted until April 26, 1996. Id. Courts
and scholars use both the 1995 and 1996 dates when citing the PLRA. See, e.g., Ann H. Mathews,
The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 536, 538 n.15 (2002).
127. See, e.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (holding that an inmate’s claim that he was
beaten by corrections officers in violation of the Eighth Amendment was barred by the PLRA’s
requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a civil rights suit); Alison M.
Mikkor, Correcting for Bias and Blind Spots in PLRA Exhaustion Law, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV.
573, 573 (2014) (describing how a prisoner’s claim of sexual assault was dismissed on the pleadings
because she had not filed a written grievance to the jail as required by the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement).
128. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (holding that “when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests”); Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the
Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1509–23 (2004) (describing the history of
judicial deference to prison officials and the impact of Turner’s legitimate penological interests
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the shielding of prison officials and guards from liability for
constitutional violations through qualified immunity 129 also present
substantial barriers. Overcoming a defense of qualified immunity
requires prisoner plaintiffs to demonstrate both that the claimed
constitutional right was “clearly established” and that a reasonable
official or guard would have been aware of the constitutional right. 130
Additionally, while the Eighth Amendment arguably provides the
strongest constitutional protections against unjust prison conditions,
courts have continuously blunted the Amendment’s protections to the
point that reaching a “cruel and unusual” finding is exceedingly rare. 131
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that that an Eighth Amendment
challenge must satisfy both a subjective and an objective test, creating an
intractable legal hurdle. 132 In Farmer v. Brennan, 133 the Supreme Court
set out the standard for the subjective test, holding that plaintiffs must
show that defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to prove a
constitutional violation. 134 “Deliberate indifference” is defined as more
than mere negligence, requiring that prison officials are aware of a risk

test).
129. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“We therefore hold that government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”).
130. Id.; see also COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL
403–04 (9th ed. 2011), available at http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/jlm/toc/. The Jailhouse
Lawyer’s Manual is “a handbook of legal rights and procedures designed for use by people in
prison,”
first
published
in
1978.
A
Jailhouse
Lawyer’s
Manual,
HRLR,
http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/jlm/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). It has been disseminated to
over two hundred U.S. prisons to bring those facilities into compliance with Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817 (1977), id., which “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
131. See, e.g., Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 18–25 (recognizing that most courts have
held that solitary confinement does not violate the Eighth Amendment and detailing the recent
history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Weidman, supra note 128, at 1505 (“Ever since the
prison reform movement ended in the early 1980s, it has become increasingly difficult for inmates
to challenge their conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment. Supreme Court rulings,
statutes, and lower courts’ conservative applications of precedent have worked together to create a
culture of deference that constrains federal courts from intervening in prison affairs.”). Deference to
“legitimate penological interests,” coupled with a higher constitutional threshold for inmate claims,
the PLRA, and lower courts’ self-regulation, has diminished the protections of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 1512–29.
132. See Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 22.
133. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
134. Id. at 834.
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to inmate health or safety, but disregard the risk. 135 Additionally, the
objective prong requires a showing that a prisoner has been deprived of a
“human need” 136 or that living conditions create a “substantial risk of
harm.” 137 In evaluating whether a specific punishment is objectively
“cruel and unusual,” the Supreme Court has stated that this standard is
not static, but is rather tied to “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” 138 Under this interpretation, the
Eighth Amendment is a living standard that changes with the times—
punishments that are presently accepted by society may later be deemed
unconstitutional. 139
Thus far, the majority of legal challenges to solitary confinement
under the Eighth Amendment have been unsuccessful. Although the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of longterm solitary confinement, several federal circuit courts have held that it
does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 140 In Ajaj v.
United States, 141 the Tenth Circuit adjudicated an Eighth Amendment
challenge to indefinite confinement at the ADX Florence supermax
prison in Colorado, which included lock-down for twenty-three hours a
day in “extreme isolation” under the glare of lights that never turned
off. 142 The court held that these conditions did not constitute a
“significant departure from the healthy habilitative environment the state
is required to provide its inmates” and thus met the constitutional
requirements of the Eighth Amendment. 143 Similarly, in Colgrove v.
Williams, 144 the Fifth Circuit held that a decade of solitary confinement
did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it did not deprive the
135. Id. at 837.
136. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (human needs include “food, warmth, or
exercise”).
137. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–46.
138. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
139. The Supreme Court has routinely cited to the “evolving standards of decency” standard
when finding various punishments unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Miller
v. Alabama, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (life imprisonment for crimes committed
before the age of eighteen); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (execution for child
rape); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005) (execution for crimes committed before the
age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (execution of the “mentally
retarded”).
140. See, e.g., Ajaj v. United States, 293 F. App’x 575 (10th Cir. 2008); Colgrove v. Williams,
105 F. App’x 537 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
141. 293 F. App’x 575 (10th Cir. 2008).
142. Id. at 582.
143. Id. at 582–84 (quoting Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1996)).
144. 105 F. App’x 537 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
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plaintiff of the “minimal measure of life’s necessities.” 145 There are
many other examples of federal courts holding that solitary confinement
lasting months or years is not inherently cruel and unusual. 146
Arguing that solitary confinement is unconstitutional for prisoners
with mental illness has been met with only slightly more success.147 A
minority of federal courts have held that the incarceration of inmates
with pre-existing mental illness in solitary confinement violates the
Eighth Amendment. 148 In Madrid v. Gomez, 149 the Northern District of
California held that the incarceration of mentally ill inmates and inmates
“at an unreasonably high risk” of becoming mentally ill in Pelican Bay’s
SHU violated the Eighth Amendment. 150 The court likened prolonged
solitary confinement for mentally ill inmates to “the mental equivalent of
putting an asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe.” 151 However, the
court also held that the “generalized psychological pain” of mentally
healthy inmates in solitary confinement did not implicate the Eighth
Amendment. 152 In Ruiz v. Johnson, 153 the Southern District of Texas
similarly held that Texas’s supermax prisons “clearly violate
constitutional standards when imposed on the subgroup of the plaintiffs’
class made up of mentally-ill prisoners.” 154 The court found that solitary
confinement acted as “virtual incubators of psychoses—seeding illness
in otherwise healthy inmates and exacerbating illness in those already
suffering from mental infirmities.” 155 Additionally, in Jones‘El v.
Berge, 156 the Western District of Wisconsin granted a temporary
injunction to remove mentally ill prisoners from a supermax prison,

145. Id. at 538 (quoting Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999)).
146. See e.g., Thomas v. Rosemeyer, 199 F. App’x 195 (3d Cir. 2006); Merchant v. HawkSawyer, 37 F. App’x 143 (6th Cir. 2002); McMillan v. Wiley, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Colo.
2011); Sital v. Burgio, 592 F. Supp. 2d 355 (W.D.N.Y. 2009); Moore v. Schuetzle, 486 F. Supp. 2d
969 (D.N.D. 2007), aff’d, 289 F. App’x 962 (8th Cir. 2008).
147. See, e.g., Jones‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d
941 (5th Cir. 2001); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
148. See, e.g., Ruiz, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 915; Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1267.
149. 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
150. Id. at 1267.
151. Id. at 1265.
152. Id.
153. 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ruiz v. United States,
243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 915.
155. Id. at 907.
156. 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
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finding that “[l]acking physical and social points of reference to ground
them in reality, seriously mentally ill inmates run a high risk of breaking
down and attempting suicide.” 157
As evidenced by Madrid, Ruiz, and Jones‘El, most successful Eighth
Amendment challenges to solitary confinement for the mentally ill are
class action suits. 158 Scholars offer several explanations for this
phenomenon, including a lower causal burden and the difficulty of
demonstrating a legitimate penological interest in confining an entire
class to solitary confinement. 159 These scholars also point out that, in
contrast, individual suits challenging the constitutionality of solitary
confinement for the mentally ill are often unsuccessful. 160
Notwithstanding the minority position adopted by the courts in
Madrid, Ruiz, and Jones‘El, courts are normally reluctant to find that a
prison has violated an individual mentally ill inmate’s Eighth
Amendment rights by placing that individual in isolation, even when
presented with the most shocking of facts. 161 One particularly illustrative
example is the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Scarver v. Litscher. 162
Christopher Scarver, a schizophrenic inmate, mounted an Eighth
Amendment challenge to his solitary confinement at a supermax prison
after attempting suicide twice and cutting his head with a razor “in an
effort to cut out whoever or whatever was talking and moving around
inside his head.” 163 Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge Richard
Posner acknowledged that “[i]t is a fair inference that conditions at
Supermax aggravated the symptoms of Scarver’s mental illness” and
described some of the prison’s responses to the manifestations of
Scarver’s mental illness—including disciplining him for banging his
head on the wall of his cell—as “bizarre.” 164 Ultimately, however, Judge
Posner concluded that prison officials “did not know what more to
do” 165 and held that there was no evidence that they acted with deliberate
indifference. 166 Similarly, in Hill v. Pugh, 167 the Tenth Circuit found that
157. Id. at 1098.
158. See Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 60.
159. See id. at 60 n.22.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006); Hill v. Pugh, 75 F. App’x 715
(10th Cir. 2003).
162. 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006).
163. Id. at 973, 975.
164. Id. at 975.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 975, 977.
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isolating a mentally ill inmate for twenty-three hours a day was not cruel
and unusual because he had access to “minimal physical requirements—
food, shelter, clothing and warmth.” 168 Other courts have employed
analogous reasoning in denying individual prisoners with mental illness
Eighth Amendment relief from prolonged isolation. 169
Due to the significant struggles of proving an Eighth Amendment
violation, mentally ill inmates and their advocates have appealed to
alternative legal protections. These alternatives include other provisions
of the Constitution, 170 such as the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 171 international human rights law, 172 and, more
recently, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 173 As the rest of this
Comment will explain, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act have enormous
potential to act as a “stop-gap” measure until Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence evolves to offer substantial protections to mentally ill
inmates in isolation. 174
II.

A POTENTIAL SLEDGEHAMMER: THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT

President George H.W. Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) on July 26th, 1990. 175 At the time, it was the largest signing
167. 75 F. App’x 715 (10th Cir. 2003).
168. Id. at 721 (quoting the trial record).
169. See, e.g., Haggins v. Minn. Comm’r of Corr., No. 10-1002 (DWF/LIB), 2012 WL 983590, at
*10 (D. Minn. Feb. 14, 2012) (holding that an inmate suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder did not have his constitutional rights violated by three years of solitary
confinement because he was seen by mental health staff once a week and received medication);
Williams v. Branker, No. 5:09-CT-3139-D, 2011 WL 649845, at *2, *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2011)
(finding no Eighth Amendment violation for an inmate who, despite a history of serious mental
illness and suicide attempts, was held in solitary confinement for approximately ten years and
sometimes left in isolation for weeks in his underwear without even a mattress); Farmer v.
Kavanagh, 494 F. Supp. 2d 345, 369–70 (D. Md. 2007) (presuming a “general awareness within the
Maryland correctional community” that placement of a mentally ill inmate in supermax
confinement could cause further mental deterioration, but holding that corrections officers were at
worst negligent, not deliberately indifferent).
170. The Equal Protection Clause does not provide strong protections for individuals with
disabilities, as the Supreme Court has held that they can be denied equal protection of the laws so
long as there is a rational basis—a very low standard. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex., v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–47 (1985) (applying rational basis scrutiny to an equal protection
claim by individuals with mental disabilities).
171. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 55, at 125–29.
172. See Hresko, supra note 44, at 16–24.
173. See, e.g., Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 65.
174. See infra Part III.
175. PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, AND POLICY: CASES AND
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ceremony on record. 176 In his remarks, President Bush promised that the
ADA would allow Americans with disabilities to “pass through onceclosed doors into a bright new era of equality, independence, and
freedom.” 177 The ADA extended the protections of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 by creating causes of action for discrimination on the basis
of disability in the workplace and private businesses. 178 It also confirmed
that any “public entity,” 179 which the U.S. Supreme Court has held
includes correctional facilities,180 could be held accountable for violating
the rights of individuals with disabilities.181 This watershed piece of
legislation has been heralded by one disability law expert as “the AllStar team of civil rights legislation” which “sought to create sweeping
change in nearly every facet of the lives of people with disabilities.”182 It
was also the first time Congress expressly acknowledged that the
segregation of individuals with disabilities constituted discrimination
and that discrimination persisted in institutional settings. 183
A.

The Elements of a Successful ADA Claim Against a Jail or Prison

Disability discrimination claims against jails or prisons fall under
Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by any “public
entity.” 184 Public entities are defined as “any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government.” 185 In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v.
Yeskey, 186 the Supreme Court confirmed that “[s]tate prisons fall

MATERIALS 46 (2005).
176. Id.
177. See Press Release, supra note *.
178. Discrimination in employment settings and by private businesses is prohibited by Title I and
III, respectively. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117, 12181–12189 (2012).
179. Id. § 12131(1). The Rehabilitation Act does not refer directly to public entities, but identifies
“any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or . . . any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency” as an accountable party. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
180. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
182. Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1808 (2005).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)–(3), (5); see also Ann K. Wooster, Actions Brought Under
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et seq.—Supreme Court Cases, 173 A.L.R.
FED. 639, § 2[a] (2001).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
185. Id. § 12131(1)(B).
186. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
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squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity.’”187 Federal
prisons are not covered under the ADA, 188 but are covered under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act for the purposes of injunctive relief. 189
Private prisons may be covered under both Title II and Title III, the title
that prohibits discrimination in “public accommodations.” 190 Given the
similarity of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, plaintiffs usually bring claims under both Acts and courts often use
the same analysis for Title II and Section 504 claims. 191
Title II, Section 12132 of the ADA states that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 192 Therefore, to bring a successful claim under Title II,
prisoner plaintiffs must prove that they (1) have a disability; (2) are an
otherwise “qualified individual”; (3) were excluded from or denied the
benefits of their jail’s or prison’s services, programs, or activities, or
were otherwise discriminated against; and (4) were excluded, denied, or
discriminated against on the basis of their disability. 193 To bring a
successful claim under Section 504, prisoner plaintiffs must prove all of
the elements of a Title II claim, as well as demonstrate that the jail or
prison receives federal funding. 194
Disability is defined broadly under the ADA as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”195
Individuals who have a “record of such an impairment” or who are

187. Id. at 210.
188. A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL, supra note 130, at 759 (citing Cellular Phone Taskforce
v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2000)).
189. Id.; see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996) (holding that Congress did not
explicitly waive sovereign immunity for monetary claims made under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act).
190. See A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL, supra note 130, at 760 (discussing the different
possible disability rights claims for inmates at private prison facilities).
191. See Betsy Ginsberg, Out with the New, In with the Old: The Importance of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to Prisoners with Disabilities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 713, 735–36 (2009) (“As
predicted shortly after the ADA took effect, the differences between [the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act] exist more in theory than in practice. Courts have consistently found that the
substantive provisions of the ADA are coextensive with those of Section 504 and have tended to
analyze the claims as one.”).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
193. See A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL, supra note 130, at 762.
194. Id.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
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“regarded as having such an impairment” are also covered. 196 The
definition of “mental impairment” includes “mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.” 197 It also extends to alcoholics and drug addicts 198 who are
not currently using illegal drugs. 199 “Major life activities” include, but
are not limited to, caring for oneself, communicating, concentrating,
learning, and sleeping. 200 Some courts have also held that interacting
with others meets the definition of a major life activity. 201 The precise
meaning of “substantially limits” has become less important to ADA
claims following the passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
which stated that “the question of whether an individual’s impairment is
a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” 202
A “qualified individual” is a person who meets the “essential
eligibility requirements” of a service, program, or activity. 203 The
Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners are not excluded from the
definition of “qualified individual” simply because they are
incarcerated. 204 The Court has also recognized that nearly all aspects of
prison life are a service, program, or activity. In Yeskey, Justice Scalia
parsed the application of Title II in the prison context, concluding that
“[m]odern prisons provide inmates with many recreational ‘activities,’
medical ‘services,’ and educational and vocational ‘programs,’ all of
which at least theoretically ‘benefit’ the prisoners (and any of which
disabled prisoners could be ‘excluded from participation in’).” 205 Yeskey
confirmed that the ADA’s protections extend to prisoners with
disabilities.
The ADA requires that prison activities, services, and programs be
administered by correctional officials “in the most integrated setting

196. Id. § 12103(1)(B)–(C).
197. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i) (2014).
198. Id. § 35.104(1)(ii).
199. Id. § 35.104(5)(iii).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2) (defining “major life activities”
within the broader definition of “[d]isability”).
201. See, e.g., McAlindin v. Cnty. of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999). See
generally Patrick A. Hartman, “Interacting with Others” as a Major Life Activity Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 139 (2005) (discussing a circuit split
on the issue and arguing that “interacting with others” should be recognized as a major life activity).
202. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
204. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998).
205. Id. at 210.
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appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 206
Additionally, these officials must make “reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures . . . to avoid discrimination,” unless
they can demonstrate that these modifications would “fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program, or activity,” 207 or impose “undue
financial and administrative burdens.” 208 Some courts have required
defendants to meet an elevated threshold to prove that a modification
would be a fundamental alteration or create an undue burden. 209 For
example, in Pierce v. County of Orange, 210 the District Court for the
Central District of California held that the County had not demonstrated
that the plaintiff class’s requested modification—including physical
modifications to the facilities and providing accommodating programs,
services, and activities—would be a fundamental alteration or undue
burden. 211 The County claimed that budgetary shortfalls and security
risks precluded their ability to make these modifications, and offered
evidence of layoffs, hiring freezes, and testimony of a $24 million
shortfall in the sheriff’s overall budget. 212 However, the court held that
there was “little specific evidence” to demonstrate that the modifications
in question would have a fiscal impact. 213 Similarly in Henderson v.
Thomas, 214 the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
rejected the Alabama Department of Corrections’ claims that integrating
HIV-positive inmates into the general population would diminish the
quality of HIV treatment and would create an undue financial burden.215
The court noted that the evidence demonstrated that the policy of
segregation may in fact hinder treatment 216 and cost the state more than
integration. 217 In a particularly sharp rebuke, the court stated that the
206. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2014); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999).
207. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
208. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.17 (1987) (analyzing a
Rehabilitation Act claim and recognizing as “well established” that an “[a]ccommodation is not
reasonable if it either imposes ‘undue financial and administrative burdens’ on a grantee, or requires
‘a fundamental alternation in the nature of [the] program’” (internal citations omitted)).
209. Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1299–1309 (M.D. Ala. 2012); Pierce v. Cnty.
of Orange, 761 F. Supp. 2d 915, 940–42 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
210. 761 F. Supp. 2d 915 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
211. Id. at 940–42.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 940.
214. 913 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
215. Id. at 1299–1309.
216. Id. at 1305.
217. Id. at 1306, 1308.

15 - Knowles.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

THE SHAMEFUL WALL OF EXCLUSION

6/3/2015 1:33 PM

919

Department’s “protestations . . . expose a persistent pattern in the
[Department] of maintaining the status quo on the basis of mere
assumptions rather than actual investigation.” 218 Therefore a prison or
jail can only overcome the ADA’s presumption of integration and
modification with detailed and legitimate justifications. 219
B.

The Advantages and Drawbacks of an ADA Claim Compared to an
Eighth Amendment Claim

Two of the major hurdles to proving a constitutional claim under the
Eighth Amendment—subjective intent and qualified immunity—are
usually not at issue in statutory disability discrimination claims. While
the Eighth Amendment requires a showing of subjective “deliberate
indifference,” 220 the ADA and Section 504 have no such requirement
(although some courts have required a showing of deliberate
indifference when a prisoner plaintiff seeks compensatory damages). 221
In fact, a showing of disparate impact may be enough to prove a
disability rights claim. 222 Additionally, most courts to consider the issue
have held that because the defendants targeted by Title II and Section
504 claims are public entities and not individuals, the defense of
qualified immunity does not apply. 223 Lastly, in some jurisdictions
218. Id. at 1302.
219. See, e.g., Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 65–66 (“The disability discrimination
paradigm demonstrates that it is possible to place the burden of justification on the prison officials,
and for this requirement to be specific.”).
220. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1994).
221. See, e.g., Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2004).
222. See, e.g., BLANCK ET AL., supra note 175, at 410–13 (citing cases).
223. Qualified immunity is generally an individual defense that is available to government
officials in civil suits for constitutional or statutory violations. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The majority of courts have held that “public entities” under Title II are not
individuals, and are therefore not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Walker v.
Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000) (“In suits under Title II of the ADA . . . the proper
defendant usually is an organization rather than a natural person. . . . In the main [provisions of the
ADA] . . . and in this case, institutional liability is exclusive, so qualified immunity is
unavailable.”); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8, 1012 (8th Cir. 1999) (en
banc), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1146 (2000), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000); Wesley v.
Vaughn, No. CIV.A. 99–1228, 1999 WL 1065209, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1999); see also Rachel
E. Brodin, Remedying a Particularized Form of Discrimination: Why Disabled Plaintiffs Can and
Should Bring Claims for Police Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 157, 185–86 (2005) (referencing the ADA Practice and Compliance Manual). Contra
Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding that there is no individual
liability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, but conducting a qualified immunity analysis
regardless); Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (stating that nothing in
Title II prohibits suits against individuals in their official or individual capacities).
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prison officials may not be able to hide behind an amorphous screen of
“legitimate penological interests” to justify discrimination under the
disability statutes as they would have license to do when accused of
Eighth Amendment violations. 224
Another significant advantage to litigating solitary confinement cases
under the disability rights statutes is that prisoners with successful ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims may be entitled to fees that are not
available for constitutional claims. For example, the disability rights
statutes have no specific restrictions on the recovery of attorneys’
fees, 225 while prisoners with successful Eighth Amendment claims are
subject to the restrictions imposed by the PLRA. 226 The PLRA restricts
the recoupment of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which
includes all civil rights suits brought by prisoner plaintiffs under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 227 Section 1983 in turn provides a remedy against
individuals who violate the Constitution or laws “under color” of legal
authority. 228 Several courts have determined that because the ADA and

224. See, e.g., Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 69 (“[T]he disability rights statutes do not
render irrelevant the penological concerns of prison officials, but compared with the Eighth
Amendment, the prison’s burden to demonstrate the necessity of a particular denial is both heavier
and more clearly defined.”); cf. Brian Lester, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Exclusion
of Inmates from Services in Prisons: A Proposed Analytical Approach Regarding the Appropriate
Level of Judicial Scrutiny of a Prisoner’s ADA Claim, 79 N.D. L. REV. 83, 93–103 (2003)
(describing various federal circuit approaches to incorporating the Turner “legitimate penological
interests” test, discussed supra, note 128, into the disability rights framework).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2012). But see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601, 610 (2001) (holding that
attorney’s fees for ADA claims are not available under the “catalyst theory,” “which posits that a
plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a
voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct”).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Prisoner disability rights claims are likely still subject to the other
sections of the PLRA, including the administrative exhaustion requirement, id. § 1997e(a), and the
restrictions on “mental or emotional injury” claims, id. § 1997e(e). See, e.g., JAMES C.
HARRINGTON, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., OVERCOMING SECTION
1983 HURDLES: USING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO RE-OPEN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
DOOR AND HOLD GOVERNMENT AND POLICE ACCOUNTABLE *12 (Apr. 19, 2007), available at 2007
WL 5269445; The Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act on Correctional Mental Health
Litigation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–52 (2008). The “mental or emotional injury” restriction
limits recovery for these harms “without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a
sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Although mentally ill inmates certainly suffer mental and
emotional injuries in solitary confinement, this Comment argues that the solitary confinement of
these inmates should be challenged as discrimination and/or an exclusion from benefits under the
ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12132, not as a mental and emotional injury.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The PLRA’s attorney’s fees statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), specifically
restricts fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which authorizes the recoupment of attorney’s fees for
§ 1983 actions.
228. Id.

15 - Knowles.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

THE SHAMEFUL WALL OF EXCLUSION

6/3/2015 1:33 PM

921

Rehabilitation Act have their own fee recoupment statutes separate from
Section 1988, the PLRA restrictions do not apply. 229 Additionally,
prisoner plaintiffs may also be able to recover experts’ fees in successful
ADA claims, but not for claims brought under Section 504 or
Section 1983. 230 However, there is some debate over whether
compensatory damages are recoverable against state agencies under the
ADA, 231 and the Supreme Court has held that punitive damages are not
available. 232
A disability rights approach can have disadvantages as well, including
two safety exceptions that could allow prisons and jails to justify the
continued solitary confinement of mentally ill prisoners. 233 The first
exception allows for a public entity to “impose legitimate safety
requirements necessary for the safe operation of its services, programs,
or activities.” 234 However, these requirements must be grounded in
“actual risks, not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations
about individuals with disabilities.” 235 Under the second exception, a jail
or prison is not liable if an inmate poses a “direct threat to the health or
safety of others.” 236 Prisoners who are a danger to themselves are not
included in this exception. 237 Under the Supreme Court’s holding in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 238 individualized assessments
are required to substantiate direct threats. These assessments must
evaluate the following four factors: (1) the nature of the risk, (2) the
duration of the risk, (3) the severity of the risk, and (4) the probability of
harm. 239 The Arline factors have also been codified in the ADA
regulations. 240 Additionally, the jail or prison must also assess whether
reasonable modifications will “mitigate the risk” of injury. 241
Another potential drawback is the difficulty of achieving class
229. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Davis, 318 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2003); Beckford v. Irvin, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 88 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
230. See, e.g., Ginsberg, supra note 191, at 727–28.
231. See, e.g., BLANCK ET AL., supra note 175, at 617.
232. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002).
233. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h) (2014) (nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in state and local
government services).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. § 35.139(a).
237. Id.
238. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
239. Id. at 287–88.
240. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b).
241. Id.
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certification on behalf of a group of mentally ill prisoners asserting
claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 242 In order to be certified
as a class, litigants must demonstrate that “there are questions of law or
fact common to the class.” 243 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 244 the
Supreme Court heightened the requirements for commonality, holding
that a potential class must demonstrate a “common contention” that will
“resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims
in one stroke.” 245 Because “mental illness” is not a singular diagnosis—
but rather manifests and is treated in a variety of different ways—it can
be difficult to formulate both a common claim of discrimination and a
common solution that is appropriate for class-wide action. 246
Additionally, some inmates may be resistant to bringing a disability
rights claim due to the stigma of disclosing a mental illness. 247 The
challenge of persuading individuals to recognize or disclose their own
mental illness has been well-documented in the criminal law context,
particularly with regards to insanity pleas. 248 Inmates may be worried
about being labeled mentally ill by corrections officials and other
inmates. 249 Litigants may also face difficulties in proving that their
mental illness is serious enough to qualify as a disability but not serious
enough to preclude one’s status as a “qualified individual” for various
242. Contra notes 159–160, supra, and accompanying text (noting that most successful Eighth
Amendment cases challenging the solitary confinement of mentally ill prisoners are class actions).
243. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
244. __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
245. Id. at 2551.
246. See, e.g., Juste v. Rivera, No. 1:12-CV-108, 2012 WL 6929137, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14,
2012) (declining to find commonality because “each member of the proposed class had different
medical problems, received different medical treatment from different providers, and had different
outcomes”); Mathis v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 2:08-CT-21-D, 2012 WL 600865, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Feb.
23, 2012) (The court declined to certify a class of prisoners challenging insufficient medical
treatment, finding that “[the class representative] does not challenge a concrete policy. Rather, [he]
challenges a constellation of unspecified ‘organizations, systems, policies, procedures, practices,
acts, and omissions.’”). Contra Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517, at *18 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012)
(upholding the certification of a 23(b)(2) class of mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement
seeking injunctive relief for medical treatment).
247. See, e.g., Justine A. Dunlap, What’s Competence Got to Do With It: The Right Not To Be
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 495, 512–14 (1997).
248. See, e.g., David S. Cohn, Offensive Use of the Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity
Defense Over the Defendant’s Objection, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 295–96 (1988) (listing
multiple reasons why a defendant may reject an insanity defense, including the risk of indefinite
hospitalization, stigma, and discrimination).
249. See generally Robert D. Miller & Jeffrey L. Metzner, Psychiatric Stigma in Correctional
Facilities, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 621 (1994) (describing the impact of mental
illness stigma in correctional systems).
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programs and activities. 250 To be a qualified individual, one must
“meet[] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services
or the participation in programs or activities.” 251 One scholar has
identified this as the “I’m ok/I’m not ok” litigation strategy problem. 252
Lastly, the question of whether Title II of the ADA properly
abrogated state sovereign immunity remains unresolved. 253 Under the
Eleventh Amendment, states have sovereign immunity from suits filed
by individuals, 254 although Congress can abrogate this immunity through
statute. 255 The Supreme Court has been cautious to embrace all of Title
II as properly abrogating state sovereign immunity, favoring a more
piecemeal approach.256 Therefore, for both claims against state entities
and individuals sued in their official capacity for monetary damages, 257
litigants should carefully monitor this rapidly changing area of law. 258
C.

Cracks in the Wall: Pending Litigation Challenging the Isolation of
Mentally Ill Inmates as a Violation of the Disability Rights Statutes

In Olmstead v. L.C., 259 the Supreme Court recognized that the
“unjustified isolation” of the mentally ill in a medical setting is

250. Michelle Parikh, Note, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There Is Nothing Left for
Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to Persons with Mental Illness, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 721, 749 (2004).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012). Programs and activities can include recreation, medical care,
educational opportunities, and job training. See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
210 (1998).
252. See Parikh, supra note 250, at 749.
253. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 35, at 34.
254. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890).
255. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–57 (1996) (recognizing that
Congress can abrogate states’ sovereign immunity through explicit language); see also id. at 59
(confirming that such abrogation is proper if supported by Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (holding that Title II abrogated
sovereign immunity where the alleged unlawful conduct actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518, 533–34 (2004) (holding that Title II abrogated
state sovereign immunity with regard to access to the courts).
257. Suits against individuals in their official capacities are treated as suits against the state for
the purposes of state sovereign immunity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). However,
suits against individuals in their official capacities for injunctive relief are not barred by sovereign
immunity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). Suits against local governments are also
not barred by sovereign immunity. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 701
(1978).
258. See, e.g., JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL, supra note 130, at 783.
259. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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discrimination under the ADA. 260 Olmstead concerned the confinement
of mentally ill and mentally disabled women in psychiatric hospitals in
Georgia. 261 Although their treating psychiatrists had determined that
they could be treated in a community setting, they remained
institutionalized. 262 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that
the ADA explicitly prohibited the discriminatory segregation and
isolation of individuals with disabilities.263 Ginsburg rested her analysis
on two “evident judgments” 264: that the segregation of those with
disabilities “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community
life,” 265 and that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the
everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational
advancement, and cultural enrichment.” 266 She concluded that
individuals with mental disabilities are entitled to appropriate
community-based treatment, so long as they do not oppose such
treatment and there are resources available from the states to
accommodate them. 267
At least two cases have applied Olmstead’s reasoning to the prison
context. In Henderson v. Thomas, 268 the District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama held that HIV-positive inmates could not be
categorically segregated from the general prison population, 269 citing
Olmstead in its analysis. 270 The plaintiffs in Henderson were HIVpositive inmates who were segregated in isolated housing from the

260. Id. at 597.
261. Id. at 593.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 600 (“Congress not only required all public entities to refrain from discrimination, see
42 U.S.C. § 12132; additionally, in findings applicable to the entire statute, Congress explicitly
identified unjustified ‘segregation’ of persons with disabilities as a ‘for[m] of discrimination.’ See
§ 12101(a)(2) (‘historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem’); § 12101(a)(5) (‘individuals with disabilities
continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including . . . segregation’).” (alterations in
original)).
264. Id. at 600.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 601.
267. Id. at 607.
268. 913 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2012).
269. Id. at 1318.
270. Id. at 1288.
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general prison population. 271 Some were even required to wear white
arm bands to designate their status. 272 The court held that this form of
isolation, if maintained without an individualized assessment of the risk
of HIV transmission, constituted a violation of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act.273 Further in Stiles v. Judd, 274 the Middle District of
Florida denied a motion to dismiss an ADA claim 275 made by the
surviving spouse of an inmate who had committed suicide in isolation. 276
The court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the inmate
“was unjustifiably isolated from other prisoners on the basis of his
mental illness,” citing Olmstead. 277 The case ultimately settled. 278
Despite these analogous cases, few, if any, litigants have successfully
invoked the disability rights statutes to challenge the solitary
confinement of prisoners with mental illness. 279 There have been several
recent cases filed attempting to advance the theory that isolating
mentally ill inmates constitutes disability discrimination, 280 and the DOJ
271. Id. at 1280–82.
272. Id. at 1282.
273. Id. at 1287–89 (“The court agrees that ‘segregation’ is an uncomfortable term, loaded with
implications of prejudice. The court also finds that it is an appropriate way to describe the policy at
issue here. Mandatory separate housing in a separate dorm . . . would doubtlessly violate the ADA if
unjustified.”).
274. Stiles v. Judd (Stiles II), No. 8:12–cv–02375–T–27EAJ, 2013 WL 6185404 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
25, 2013).
275. Id. at *1–3.
276. The facts of this case are described in another opinion in the same case. See Stiles v. Judd
(Stiles I), No. 8:12–cv–02375–T–27EAJ, 2013 WL 4714402, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013).
277. Stiles II, 2013 WL 6185404, at *2.
278. Stiles v. Judd, No. 8:12–cv–02375–T–27EAJ (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2014) (docket).
279. Ironically, at least one court has held that failing to separate mentally ill inmates from the
general prison population constitutes a violation of the ADA. In Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727
(D.V.I. 1997), the District Court of the Virgin Islands held that housing a physically disabled inmate
with a group of mentally ill inmates placed the physically disabled inmate at “unnecessary and
unwarranted risk of personal injury” on the basis of his disability. Id. at 741. The same court also
found that “[f]ailure to house mentally ill inmates apart from the general prison population also
violates the constitutional rights of both groups. . . . Commingling the two populations increases the
level of tension among all prisoners and endangers the well-being of the mentally ill who suffer
from retaliation.” Id. at 738–39. Carty was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Olmstead, which held that the “unjustified isolation” of the mentally ill violated the ADA. Olmstead
v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). Another court has held that placing mentally ill inmates in
solitary confinement for violent and self-destructive behavior does not constitute discrimination
under the disability rights statutes if non-mentally ill inmates are also placed in isolation for this
same behavior. See Atkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“With
no allegation of disparate treatment, no claim for discrimination under the ADA or Rehabilitation
Act lies.”).
280. See, e.g., Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Colo. 2012); Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial
Brief Regarding Enforcement of Court Orders and Affirmative Relief Regarding Improper Housing
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has also clearly interpreted the ADA as protecting prisoners who are
placed in solitary confinement on the basis of their mental illness.281 The
following Section will describe the chronology of recent case law,
including pending cases.
1.

The Disability Discrimination Theory Emerges: Pro Se Litigants
and Anderson

Mentally ill prisoners representing themselves pro se have been
claiming that isolation violates their rights under the disability rights
statutes for years. However, there have been few, if any, successful
cases, with most courts dismissing prisoners’ claims for failing to
properly articulate the grounds for their complaints. 282 Cases brought by
advocates have also been similarly unsuccessful. 283
In one particularly well-documented case, the Civil Rights Clinic at
the University of Denver brought a discrimination claim on behalf of
Troy Anderson, 284 a mentally ill inmate at the Colorado State
Penitentiary (CSP) who had been in solitary confinement for over ten
years. 285 Anderson, who was adopted as an infant, began having suicidal
thoughts at age ten—the same year he fired a gun into a waterbed. 286
During his teenage years, he spent two years in a lockdown unit at a
psychiatric hospital. 287 His rap sheet—both in and out of prison—is long
and bizarre, involving stacks of assaults, escape attempts, and multiple
shoot-outs with police. 288 He is currently serving a seventy-five year
sentence. 289 At CSP, prison health officials responsible for evaluating
and Treatment of Seriously Mentally Ill Prisoners in Segregation, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv00520-LKK-DAD (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014), ECF No. 4985 [hereinafter Coleman Post-Trial Brief];
Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. C133667-SBA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter G.F. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief]; Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Sardakowski v. Clements, No. 12-cv-01326-RBJ-KLM (D.
Colo. Nov. 19, 2012), ECF No. 62 [hereinafter Sardakowski Complaint].
281. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 32, at 31–37.
282. See, e.g., Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F. App’x 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2008); Norris v.
Marrero, No. 5:14-234-DCR, 2014 WL 7366224, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 24, 2014); Goins v. Beard,
No. 09-1223, 2011 WL 4345874, at *11–12 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2011).
283. See, e.g., Atkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
284. See Complaint, Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Colo. May 3, 2010) (No.
1:10-cv-01005-WYD) [hereinafter Anderson Complaint].
285. Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 69.
286. Alan Prendergast, Head Games, DENV. WESTWORD (Sept. 21, 2006),
http://www.westword.com/2006-09-21/news/head-games/.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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Anderson have “toss[ed] out diagnoses like confetti,” variously labeling
him as having schizoaffective disorder, post-traumatic stress, several
personality disorders, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder,
and possible frontal lobe injuries. 290 The complaint filed by the Civil
Rights Clinic on his behalf alleged that CSP staff had denied Anderson
prescribed medication, as well as “denied [him] the ability to progress
out of segregation, based on behavior that is the direct result of his
disability.” 291
In the resulting litigation, Anderson v. Colorado, 292 Anderson’s
attorneys, Brittany Glidden and Laura Rovner, 293 argued that CSP’s
policies and procedures were detrimental to Anderson’s mental health
and that CSP was denying him access to the opportunities that would
allow him to progress out of segregation. 294 Recognizing that a
“traditional approach” would have relied singularly on an Eighth
Amendment challenge to Anderson’s solitary confinement, 295 Glidden
and Rovner crafted an alternative approach, arguing that the conditions
of solitary confinement were not “reasonable accommodations” of
Anderson’s mental illness under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, 296 and
also violated the Eighth Amendment. 297 They challenged each restrictive
condition of isolation, but did not request his release to the general
prison population. 298 This was done in part because Anderson was afraid
that, if he was placed in the general prison population without treatment,
he would violently lash out at other prisoners. 299 Glidden and Rovner
challenged each denial of access individually, including the facility’s
denial of Anderson’s requests for contact visits with his family, reading
materials, and correspondence courses. 300 Their strategy was to “parse
‘solitary confinement’ into its elements and remove those that were not
justified by safety or another legitimate interest.” 301 Although they

290. Id. (quoting retired forensic psychiatrist John Macdonald).
291. Anderson Complaint, supra note 284, at 4.
292. 877 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Colo. 2012).
293. These attorneys are also the authors of Requiring the State to Justify Supermax Confinement
for Mentally Ill Prisoners. See Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27.
294. Anderson, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
295. See Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 70.
296. See Anderson Complaint, supra note 284, at 35–36.
297. Id. at 34–35.
298. See Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 69–70.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 73–74.
301. Id. at 70.
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conceded that Anderson’s isolation was necessary for safety, they argued
that denying him other “benefits” afforded the general prison population
was “punitive and discriminatory” as opposed to required for safety. 302
However, the court ultimately did not reach the merits of many of the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. 303 On those ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims that remained—challenging the denial of
medication and treatment—the court held that Anderson had failed to
establish violations of the disability rights statutes.304 The court reasoned
that “it is not the Court’s place to second guess the judgment of health
care professionals who seem both capable and sincerely committed to
making [the prison’s mental illness program] work in general and for
Mr. Anderson.” 305 The court did find that Anderson’s Eighth
Amendment rights had been violated, 306 and ordered CSP to allow him
access to outdoor exercise and medication. 307 Although the disability
rights claims were not successful in Anderson, the case is notable for its
innovative approach.
2.

A Tipping Point: The Department of Justice’s Cresson Findings
Letter

Under Title II of the ADA, the DOJ has the authority to monitor state
and federal prisons and seek relief for violations. 308 In May 2013, the
DOJ announced in a findings letter that the Pennsylvania State
Correctional Institution at Cresson had violated Title II, Section 12132
of the ADA by placing prisoners with mental illness and mental
disabilities in solitary confinement. 309 The DOJ revealed in its findings
letter that Cresson “Unnecessarily Segregates and Isolates Prisoners with
Disabilities and Fails To Reasonably Modify its Policies and
Practices,” 310 and also “Fails to Properly Assess Prisoners on an
Individual Basis To Determine Whether Segregation Is Appropriate
Housing.” 311 The DOJ did concede that it was necessary to remove some

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
Id. at 74 n.87.
Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1145, 1148 (D. Colo. 2012).
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1142, 1145.
Id. at 1157.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2012); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.172–35.174 (2014).
See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 32, at 1.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.
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mentally ill prisoners from the general prison population, but concluded
that Cresson had violated the ADA by denying these isolated prisoners
access to treatment or other programs or services. 312
The factual findings of the letter provided several case studies of
discrimination. These case studies included a description of “OO,” a
schizophrenic inmate with an IQ of 55 who had been disciplined with
more than 3.5 years of segregation. 313 The vast majority of this
discipline resulted from “OO’s” failure to stand for count, although his
clinical record indicates that he did not even realize he was incarcerated
until after he had taken medication for several weeks. 314 In another
illustrative example, “PP,” a mentally disabled inmate with anxiety and
antisocial personality disorder, was sentenced to thirty days of
disciplinary time in segregation for attempting suicide. 315 “PP” was also
charged $24.12 for the towel he attempted to kill himself with. 316 The
letter connected Cresson’s use of solitary confinement with the increased
destabilization of inmates with mental illness.317 The letter also noted
that most of the attempted suicides at the facility occurred in isolation
units. 318
Before the results of the DOJ’s investigation were revealed, the state
of Pennsylvania decided to close Cresson and transfer inmates to another
facility. 319 Shortly after the publication of the letter, the DOJ’s
interpretation of the ADA attracted wide media attention. 320 Since the
release of the findings letter, the DOJ has expanded its investigation to
the entire Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 321 finding similar
312. Id. at 37.
313. Id. at 36.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1–2.
318. Id. at 2.
319. See id., at 4–5; Karen Langley, Feds Investigate Treatment of Mental Health Inmates at
Cresson State Prison, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 31, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://www.postgazette.com/local/region/2013/05/31/Feds-investigate-treatment-of-mental-health-inmates-atCresson-state-prison/stories/201305310184.
320. See e.g., Jessica Hathaway, Justice Department Determines PA Prison Violated Inmate Civil
Rights, EXAMINER.COM (June 1, 2013, 5:28 PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/justicedepartment-determines-pa-prison-violated-inmate-civil-rights; Susan Jones, DOJ Using ADA to Get
Psychotic Prisoners Out of Solitary, CNSNEWS.COM (June 3, 2013, 9:28 AM), http://cnsnews.com/
news/article/doj-using-ada-get-psychotic-prisoners-out-solitary.
321. See Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice &
David J. Hickton, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, to Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa. (Feb. 24,
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/pdoc_finding_2-24-14.pdf.
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violations of the ADA, 322 and submitted statements of interest in two
highly relevant cases: Coleman v. Brown 323 in 2013, 324 and G.F. v.
Contra Costa County 325 in 2014. 326 The following Section will discuss
these cases and other ongoing litigation challenging the isolation of
mentally ill inmates as a violation of the disability rights statutes.
3.

Pending Litigation: Coleman, Contra Costa County, and
Sardakowski

There are at least three ongoing cases that advance the theory that
placing mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement violates the
disability rights statutes—Coleman, Contra Costa County, and
Sardakowski v. Clements. 327 Coleman has resulted in sweeping policy
changes across the entire state of California,328 and the other two cases
are currently in settlement negotiations. 329 Although these three cases
represent important advancements, there is currently little, if any, case
precedent recognizing that solitary confinement for mentally ill inmates
violates the disability rights statutes.
Coleman v. Brown is a seminal class action prisoners’ rights case that
has been ongoing since 1990. 330 The class alleged that the lack of access
322. Id. at 17–22.
323. Complaint, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1990).
324. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv00520-LKK-JFM (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Coleman Statement of Interest].
325. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 3:13cv.03667-MEJ (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013).
326. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 3:13cv.03667-MEJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Contra Costa County Statement of Interest].
327. Sardakowski Complaint, supra note 280. A fourth case filed shortly after the DOJ letter,
Stiles v. Judd, discussed supra note 278, settled in March 2014.
328. Coleman v. Brown, No. CIV. S-90-520 LKK/DAD (PC), at 4–5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014);
see Sam Stanton & Denny Walsh, California Prisons to Dramatically Alter Treatment for Mentally
Ill Inmates, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/
article2608166.html.
329. Minute Entry, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 3:13-cv-03667-MEJ (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2015) (docket) (showing a partial settlement on February 26, 2015 and the last entry on the docket
as of May 5, 2015 as a minute entry regarding a settlement conference); Minute Entry, Sardakowski
v. Clements, No. 1:12-cv-01326-RBJ-KLM (D. Colo. Dec. 16, 2014) (docket) (showing the last
entry on the docket as of May 5, 2015 as a minute entry regarding a settlement conference).
330. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 898 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. 2009).
The Coleman case is also intertwined with the Brown v. Plata, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011),
litigation, in which the Supreme Court held that the overpopulation of California jails violated the
Eighth Amendment and ordered the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design
capacity within two years. Id. at 1923, 1947. See Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and
Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165 (2013)
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to mental health care in California state prisons violated the Eighth
Amendment and was awarded a permanent injunction in 1995. 331 In
2014, nearly twenty years into the injunction, the prisoner class protested
that the constitutional violations still persisted, alleging that the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
“continue[s] to vastly overuse and over-rely on segregation . . . refusing
to implement straightforward, well-established measures to reduce the
suffering and death of class members.” 332
In August 2013, the DOJ filed a statement of interest in the Coleman
litigation, asking “to bring to this Court’s attention” the DOJ’s recent
factual and legal findings at Cresson regarding the disability rights
statutes. 333 The class’s attorneys also cited the DOJ findings letter in
their reply brief, noting the “striking parallels” between the solitary
confinement practices at Cresson and throughout the entire California
corrections system. 334 In August 2014, the CDCR submitted a new and
comprehensive state-wide mental health policy to the court, including
proposals for new units, more out-of-cell time, and better mental health
treatment. 335 Michael Bien, one of the lead attorneys for the prisoner
class, remarked that “[t]here was a different atmosphere during the
negotiations with Corrections on these modifications. We felt we were
listened to . . . . We felt there was an acknowledgment that the old ways
were not effective, and even dangerous for the inmates.” 336 The
permanent injunction is currently still in place as the new policies are
being implemented. 337
The same month that the DOJ filed a statement of interest in the
Coleman litigation, a class of juvenile offenders with disabilities in
California filed a disability rights case against Contra Costa County. In
the resulting litigation, G.F. v. Contra Costa County, 338 the class alleged
that the Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall was “subjecting youth with
(discussing the Coleman and Plata litigation in-depth).
331. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1311 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
332. Coleman Post-Trial Brief, supra note 280, at 1.
333. See Coleman Statement of Interest, supra note 324, at 2.
334. Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for Enforcement of Court Orders and Affirmative
Relief Regarding Improper Housing and Treatment of Seriously Mentally Ill Prisoners in
Segregation at 3, Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520-LKK-JFM (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013)
[hereinafter Coleman Plaintiffs’ Reply].
335. See Erica Goode, California Revises Rules Covering the Use of Force on Mentally Ill
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014, at A22; Stanton & Walsh, supra note 328.
336. Stanton & Walsh, supra note 328.
337. Coleman v. Brown, No. CIV. S-90-520 LKK/DAD (PC), at 4–5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014).
338. G.F. v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 3:13-cv-03667 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013).
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disabilities to unconscionable conditions of solitary confinement based
on their disability-related behavior—sometimes for weeks or months at a
time—while watching them deteriorate mentally.” 339 Members of the
class alleged that they were placed and kept in isolation for behaviors
directly related to the manifestation of their mental illnesses, including
spitting, talking to themselves, laughing inappropriately, and facial
twitching. 340 The use of solitary confinement at the Juvenile Hall
resulted in hundreds of hours of missed classroom time, violating
federally and state mandated access to education. 341 As it did in the
Coleman litigation, the DOJ filed a statement of interest laying out its
interpretation of the ADA and specifically asking the court to deny the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. 342 As of April 2015, the case is in
ongoing settlement hearings. 343
In 2012, the Denver Civil Rights Clinic at the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law, which filed the Anderson case, filed another case
against the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) on behalf of
mentally ill inmate James Sardakowski. 344 The Clinic’s theory of the
case was similar to the “reasonable modification” theory advanced in
Anderson. 345 Sardakowski is a diagnosed schizophrenic who has been
incarcerated by the CDOC since 2006 and in solitary confinement at the
Colorado State Penitentiary (CSP) since 2009. 346 He was placed in
solitary confinement after being taken off of his medication for
“cheeking” (not swallowing) it and for banging his head against a
wall. 347
Sardakowski is currently under extremely restrictive conditions of
confinement at CSP. He is allowed two books that can be exchanged
once a year, 348 and can leave his cell for only one hour a day to shower
and exercise in the indoor recreation room. 349 He cannot complete the
339. Class Action First Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
at 2, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. C13-3667-SBA (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2013), ECF No. 87.
340. See Contra Costa County Statement of Interest, supra note 326, at 5.
341. Id. at 1.
342. Id. at 13.
343. Minute Entry, G.F. v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 3:13-cv-03667-MEJ (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2015) (docket) (showing the last entry on the docket as of May 5, 2015 as a minute entry regarding
a settlement conference).
344. Sardakowski Complaint, supra note 280.
345. See id. at 32–36.
346. Id. at 6, 10.
347. Id. at 9–10.
348. Id. at 11.
349. Id.
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“leveling out” program that would place him back in general population
because his “mental illness prevents him from meeting the behaviorbased requirements for long periods of time.” 350 Sardakowski’s failure to
meet these requirements include repeated incidences of self-harm, such
as hitting his head against the wall, biting his hands until they bleed, and
attempting self-castration. 351 When Sardakowski self-harms, staff chain
him to a bed and put him in a motorcycle helmet and diaper for days at a
time. 352 In the complaint filed on behalf of Sardakowski, the Clinic
alleged that this treatment violates both the Eighth Amendment as well
as the disability rights statutes.353 Specifically, the Clinic alleged that
CDOC was not providing Sardakowski with an alternative means of
completing the “leveling out” program—which he must complete to be
released from solitary confinement—and that this failure to make
reasonable accommodations constitutes discrimination. 354 As of April
2015 the Sardakowski case, like Contra Costa County, is in settlement
proceedings. 355
III. TEAR DOWN THAT WALL: PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE
TEST CASES
I don’t feel like I have control over my behavior. My behavior is
randomly picked. If I feel upset then I act out
behaviorally . . . . It’s worse in ad seg [administrative
segregation], because I can’t walk away from the situation to try
to think rationally. You build up a lot of stress that you can’t
release . . . . In [general population] I could get to the point
where I could think about my actions, but here, what do I have?
I can stand at the door, then walk back to my bunk. 356
–James Sardakowski, the plaintiff in Sardakowski v. Clements 357
Although courts have been reluctant to acknowledge that the solitary

350. Id. at 12.
351. See Hearing on Reassessing Solitary Confinement II, supra note 25, at 4.
352. Id. at 5–6.
353. Sardakowski Complaint, supra note 280.
354. Id.
355. Minute Entry, Sardakowski v. Clements, No. 1:12-cv-01326-RBJ-KLM (D. Colo. Dec. 16,
2014) (docket) (showing the last entry on the docket as of May 5, 2015 to be a minute entry
regarding a settlement conference).
356. See Hearing on Reassessing Solitary Confinement II, supra note 25, at 7–8.
357. See supra Part II.C.3.
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confinement of mentally ill inmates violates the disability rights statutes,
a plain reading of the language of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act strongly indicates that these statutes provide mentally ill inmates a
viable cause of action against their isolation. 358 Mental illness qualifies
as a disability under the ADA when it substantially interferes with the
major life activities of communicating, concentrating, learning, sleeping,
and possibly interacting with others. 359 Inmates with disabling mental
illness cannot be excluded from prison “services, programs and
activities” on the basis of their disability, or otherwise be subjected to
discrimination by correctional facilities.360 Because inmates with mental
illness are often placed in solitary confinement for behavior relating to
their disability—and are subsequently excluded from participation in
prison services, programs, and activities while in isolation—these
widespread practices violate the disability rights statutes. Even if there is
a valid safety rationale for isolating a mentally ill inmate, correctional
facilities must still provide benefits and services that are equal to that of
the general prison population. 361
There are three distinct ways in which corrections facilities violate the
rights of mentally ill inmates with regard to the use of solitary
confinement: (1) by segregating mentally ill inmates from the general
prison population through the use of solitary confinement; (2) by
prolonging the isolation of inmates due to their manifesting mental
deterioration and failing to provide reasonable accommodations for the
“step-down” programs that would release them into the general prison
population; and (3) by failing to reasonably modify the conditions of
solitary confinement for those mentally ill inmates who present a safety
risk, including providing them with equal benefits and services while in
isolation. The following analysis will discuss each of these legal theories
in turn.
A.

Segregating Mentally Ill Inmates Because of Their Mental Illness
Violates the Disability Rights Statutes
As recognized by the DOJ and subsequently argued by the plaintiffs

358. See supra Part II.A.
359. Id.
360. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2014). The Rehabilitation Act provides similar protections against
discrimination by “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” See 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2012).
361. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(iv); see also Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 32, at 37.
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in the Coleman 362 and Contra Costa County 363 litigations, corrections
facilities violate the disability rights statutes when they segregate
mentally ill inmates without valid safety justifications. 364 It is usually
because mentally ill inmates have difficulty with the major life activities
of communicating, concentrating, and interacting with others that they
end up in solitary confinement. 365 These inmates often find it difficult to
“follow straightforward routine orders to sit down, to come out of a cell,
to stand up for the count, to remove clothes from cell bars, or to take
showers.” 366 As a result, mentally ill inmates are disproportionately and
unjustly punished by placement in isolation. 367
This unjustified segregation violates Title II of the ADA, which states
that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 368 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act employs similar language. 369 As the Supreme Court held in Yeskey,
almost every aspect of prison life is a “service, program, or activity,” 370
including “classification, housing, recreation, and medical and mental
health treatment . . . for which prisoners are otherwise qualified.” 371
Recognizing that “historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities,” 372 Title II additionally requires
that these prison services, programs, and activities be administered in

362. Coleman Post-Trial Brief, supra note 280, at 15 (“By warehousing class members in
segregation units because appropriate beds and timely transfers cannot be provided, Defendants’
system fails to make the reasonable accommodations necessary for mentally ill prisoners to be
housed and treated in the most integrated setting appropriate to their individual needs.”).
363. G.F. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 280, at 36 (alleging that
defendants violated the ADA by “locking Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff class in solitary
confinement due to their disabilities thereby excluding them from Defendants’ educational and
rehabilitative programs, services and activities”).
364. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 32.
365. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED, supra note 19, at 59.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 59–60 (citing various studies, including a Washington State study that showed that
while mentally ill inmates make up 18.7% of the prison population, they represent 41% of
infractions); id. at 147–49 (describing the disproportionate numbers of mentally ill inmates placed
in solitary by state correctional systems and individual institutions in Oregon, New York,
California, New Jersey, Indiana, Washington, Iowa, and Pennsylvania).
368. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
369. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
370. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998).
371. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 32, at 32 (citing Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211).
372. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
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“the most integrated setting appropriate.” 373 Mentally ill inmates that are
placed in segregation for their inability to comply with prison rules are
therefore excluded in isolation by reason of their disability from
services, programs, and activities available to the general prison
population.
While plaintiffs filing employment discrimination claims under Title I
must demonstrate causation between their disability and the allegedly
discriminatory employer action, 374 plaintiffs filing Title II claims appear
to enjoy a lower causal burden in proving that their exclusion or denial
of a benefit is “by reason of such disability.” 375 In Olmstead, the State of
Georgia argued that the plaintiffs were denied community placement due
to lack of funding, not disability discrimination. 376 The State further
argued that there was no discrimination “because ‘“discrimination”
necessarily requires uneven treatment of similarly situated individuals,’
and [the plaintiffs] had identified no comparison class, i.e., no similarly
situated individuals given preferential treatment.” 377 The Supreme Court
rejected the State’s arguments, stating that “[w]e are satisfied that
Congress had a more comprehensive view of the concept of
discrimination advanced in the ADA.” 378 Under Olmstead’s reasoning,
discriminatory segregation does not always have to be purposeful to
violate the disability discrimination statutes.379 The Supreme Court has
further recognized that “both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
claims are cognizable under the ADA.” 380 Because most facilities house
a disproportionate number of mentally ill inmates in solitary

373. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2014).
374. See, e.g., Lisa Schlesinger, The Social Model’s Case for Inclusion: “Motivating Factor” and
“But For” Standards of Proof Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Impact of the
Social Model of Disability on Employees with Disabilities, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 2125–28
(2014) (discussing the current circuit split on causation standards of proof).
375. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see, e.g., BLANCK ET AL., supra note 175, at 410–13 (parsing
interpretations of “by reason of such disability” under 42 U.S.C § 12132).
376. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 594 (1999).
377. Id. at 598.
378. Id. Contra id. at 626 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We have previously interpreted the phrase
‘by reason of’ as requiring proximate causation. . . . Such an interpretation is in keeping with the
vernacular understanding of the phrase. . . . This statute should be read as requiring proximate
causation as well.”).
379. See, e.g., Stiles I, No. 8:12–cv–02375–T–27EAJ, 2013 WL 6185404, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
25, 2013) (applying Olmstead’s reasoning to the ADA claims of a survivor of a prisoner who
committed suicide in isolation and finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the isolation
was a violation of Title II; this case was later settled).
380. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
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confinement, 381 this disparate impact alone may be enough to
demonstrate a violation of the ADA. 382 Future test cases should
capitalize on this advantage by bringing ADA claims to challenge the
unjustified segregation of mentally ill inmates.
B.

Prolonging Inmates’ Isolation Due to Their Mental Deterioration
is Also Discrimination Under the Disability Rights Statutes
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22 . . . . Orr would
be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was
sane, he had to fly them. If he flew them, he was crazy and didn’t
have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to. 383
—A description of the infamously paradoxical rule from Catch22 by Joseph Heller

Sam Mandez was not placed in solitary confinement because of his
mental illness. In fact, Mandez was, by all accounts, mentally healthy
before his placement in isolation. 384 However, CSP continued to prolong
Mandez’s solitary sentence indefinitely because he developed severe
mental illness while in solitary confinement, which caused him to act
out 385 and self-harm. 386 Mandez was even disciplined for a suicide
attempt, which the prison claimed was “abusing medical treatment.” 387
This is despite the fact that an evaluating psychiatrist determined that
Mandez’s indefinite isolation was contributing to his mental
decomposition and that he was unlikely to improve in solitary
confinement. 388 Mandez’s isolation-induced mental illness thwarted his
ability to conform his behavior to the program requirements that would
have allowed him to work his way out of solitary confinement. 389

381. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.
382. See, e.g., John F. Cockrell, Solitary Confinement: The Law Today and the Way Forward, 37
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 223–25 (2013) (arguing that inmates with mental illness in supermaxes
should bring disparate impact claims under the ADA).
383. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 55 (1961). A “catch-22” has come to mean “a problematic
situation for which the only solution is denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem or by a
rule.” Catch-22 Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/catch 22 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
384. See Cohen, supra note 2.
385. See id. (describing Mandez’s assaults on staff).
386. ACLU of Colo., supra note 10, at 16:41.
387. Id.
388. See ACLU OF COLORADO, supra note 5, at 8.
389. Id.
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The ADA and Rehabilitation Act both offer protections as soon as a
disabling mental illness manifests, regardless of whether an inmate has
no history of or predisposition to mental illness. 390 As previously
discussed, solitary confinement has been shown to foster mental illness
in mentally healthy inmates—like Sam Mandez—and to exacerbate
existing mental illness. 391 Regardless of when their illness began,
inmates with mental illness severe enough to interfere with their ability
to communicate, concentrate, learn, sleep, or perform “major life
activities” qualify as “disabled” under the definitions of the disability
rights statues. 392 When prisons extend inmates’ solitary sentences
because of their manifesting mental illness, these prisons are in clear
violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.
As documented in Mandez’s case and in the Anderson and
Sardakowski litigations, many prisons refuse to allow an inmate to
“graduate” from solitary confinement “step-down” programs solely due
to the manifestations of their illnesses.393 Manifestations that are deemed
worthy of punishment include attempts at self-harm or suicide, 394 as well
as “complaining to staff,” and “bad attitude[s] at count.” 395 Correctional
390. The disability rights statutes are largely silent with regard to time requirements for
qualifying disabilities, implying that protections are triggered at the moment of manifestation. See
42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2014). As previously explained, disability has three
definitions under the ADA: (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities,” (2) “a record of such impairment,” or (3) “being regarded as having such
an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The statutes are silent as to duration requirements as to the
first two definitions. However, individuals who are “regarded as” having a disability (whether that
disability is “actual or perceived”) only qualify for protection under the ADA if the actual or
perceived disability is not “transitory and minor.” Transitory disabilities are defined as having “an
actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). Despite this caveat, most
of the inmates in solitary confinement are truly mentally ill and therefore qualify for protection
under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.”).
391. See supra Part I.B.
392. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § (3)(1)(A), 122 Stat. 3553,
3555; see also supra Part II.A, which discusses the elements of a successful ADA claim against a
jail or prison.
393. See, e.g., METCALF ET AL., supra note 25, at 18; Sardawkosi Complaint, supra note 280;
Anderson Complaint, supra note 284, at 4; Cohen, supra note 2.
394. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE DISCIPLINE
PROGRAM 46–49 (2011) (listing “self-mutilation” as a “High Severity Level Prohibited Act” and
recommending a variety of punishments, including six months of disciplinary segregation); see also
Andrew Cohen, Should Mentally Ill Federal Prisoners Be Punished for Suicide Attempts?, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2013, 9:13 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/shouldmentally-ill-federal-prisoners-be-punished-for-suicide-attempts/274313/.
395. See Anderson Complaint, supra note 284, at 27 (“According to Mr. Anderson’s Class
Review he has received negative chrons, and is being retained in administrative segregation, for
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facilities are required to make “reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures” to avoid discriminating on the basis of
disability. 396 Prisons therefore arguably fail to make “reasonable
modifications” to these punishment schemes when they make it
impossible for mentally ill inmates to “earn” their way out of solitary
confinement. 397 As a result, these punishment schemes become cyclical
for many mentally ill inmates and a violation of the disability rights
statutes.
C.

Failure to Provide Mentally Ill Inmates in Isolation Access to
Equal Aids, Benefits, and Services Violates the Disability Rights
Statutes

As exemplified in the Anderson case, sometimes there are valid safety
reasons to isolate mentally ill prisoners from the general prison
population. 398 Anderson himself “believed there was a legitimate
reason” for keeping him in solitary confinement, including the risk that
he would “act out impulsively and violently.” 399 There are two safety
exceptions enumerated in the ADA regulations. 400 The first states that
prisons “may impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for the
safe operation of its services, programs, or activities.” 401 The second
states that prisons are not required “to permit an individual to participate
in or benefit from the services, programs, or activities of that public
entity when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others.” 402 However, correctional facilities must perform an
individualized assessment applying the Arline factors to substantiate a
claim of a direct threat, determining the exact nature, duration, severity,
and probability of harm. 403 Facilities also assess whether reasonable

incidents with no explanation other than ‘complaining to staff’ and ‘bad attitude at count.’”).
396. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2014).
397. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2 (describing how prison officials have justified Mandez’s
continued isolation because it is “necessary to protect prison staff from his frequent outbursts”);
MARK W. DIAMOND, SAMUEL VICTORIO MANDEZ 8–9 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/182916318/Dr-Diamond-Report-pdf (finding in an independent
psychiatric evaluation that Sam Mandez was not culpable for assaults on staff due to his mental
illness).
398. See Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 69–70.
399. Id.
400. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(h); id. § 35.139(a).
401. Id. § 35.130(h).
402. Id. § 35.139(a).
403. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287–88 (1987); 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b).
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modifications will “mitigate the risk” of injury. 404
Even if reasonable modifications cannot mitigate the risk of an inmate
in the general population, prisons must still provide mentally ill inmates
who are isolated for safety reasons access to aids, benefits, and services
that are the same or “equal to that afforded” prisoners in the general
population. 405 For example, in the Anderson litigation, Anderson’s
attorneys argued that the denial of specific services—including books,
education, and outdoor exercise—served no safety purpose and was
therefore discriminatory. 406 They theorized that this would shift the
burden of an affirmative defense to the prison to demonstrate that
providing these services to isolated inmates would be a “fundamental
alteration” of the prison’s service, program, or activity. 407 This would
then “force[] an articulation of the reason for the particular condition.”408
This piecemeal approach could ultimately remove many of the punitive
aspects of isolation that are so detrimental to the mental health of
inmates. 409
The American Bar Association (ABA) has made recommendations
that could potentially satisfy the ADA’s requirement that prisons provide
isolated, mentally ill inmates with equal access to aids, benefits, and
services. 410 These recommendations include in-cell programming, more
out-of-cell time, face-to-face interaction with staff, and access to phone
calls and reading material. 411 Mississippi, in particular, has found
excellent success with removing mentally ill inmates from supermaximum isolation in the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman
and placing these inmates in mental health step-down units. 412 These
404. 28 C.F.R. § 35.139(b).
405. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(i)–(ii); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 32, at 37 (“For
those prisoners with serious mental illness or intellectual disabilities who cannot be integrated into
the general population, the Facility still has an obligation to provide the prisoners with the
opportunity to participate in and benefit from mental health services and activities, and other
services, programs, and activities to which prisoners without disabilities have access.” (internal
citations omitted)).
406. See Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 70.
407. Id. at 68–69; see also HARRINGTON, supra note 226, at *11 (“One might also argue that the
ADA mandate has removed from officers the ability to plead they did not know any better; the ADA
sets on them an affirmative requirement to act appropriately with respect to prisoners with mental
disabilities.”).
408. See Glidden & Rovner, supra note 27, at 69.
409. See, e.g., id. at 70.
410. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, Standards 233.7, 23-3.8 (3d ed. 2011).
411. Id.
412. See Kupers et al., supra note 90, at 1042–43.
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units accept those inmates with the “greatest impairment in functioning,”
as well as those who repeatedly self-harm. 413 This particular step-down
program focuses on treatment, providing group treatment from highly
trained staff and peer-facilitated programming. 414 The program has been
overwhelmingly successful, resulting in a seventy percent drop in
serious incidences between prisoners, as well as between staff and
prisoners. 415 Even though these prisoners may have initially required
isolation for safety purposes, the ABA and Mississippi approaches
refocus the conditions of isolation and the purposes of step-down
programs on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment, thus bringing
solitary confinement conditions into compliance with the ADA. Future
test cases challenging the lack of aids, benefits, and services for mentally
ill inmates in solitary confinement may be able to draw on these
examples when considering alternatives to complete isolation.
CONCLUSION
At the writing of this Comment, the tide is slowly beginning to turn
against the widespread use of solitary confinement in our nation’s
prisons. In addition to the DOJ’s efforts and nascent ADA litigation,
state prisons and legislatures are beginning to examine the practical
sustainability of solitary confinement. In February 2014, the new head of
the Colorado Department of Corrections spent a night in solitary
confinement at a Colorado state penitentiary and described it as “a
dumping ground for the mentally ill.” 416 Under his watch, the
Department has vowed to remove all inmates with “major” mental
illness from administrative segregation. 417 New York State has instituted
reforms on the use of solitary confinement, including setting a cap on the
time inmates can spend in isolation and diverting mentally ill inmates
from solitary to mental health services. 418 Maine and Mississippi have
also reduced their use of solitary confinement. 419 In Texas, the prison
guard union has taken it upon itself to advocate for an end to solitary

413. Id. at 1042.
414. Id. at 1042–43.
415. Id. at 1043.
416. Raemisch, supra note 96, at A25.
417. Memorandum from Lou Archuleta, Interim Dir. of Prisons, to Wardens, Offender Servs.
(Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://aclu-co.org/wp-content/uploads/files/Memo%20Mental%20
Health%20Qualifiers%20Ad%20Seg%20MEMO%20%282%29.pdf.
418. New York Rethinks Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2014, at A24.
419. Id.
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confinement on death row. 420
However, the solitary confinement of the mentally ill is still
widespread and much work remains to be done to reform its use. This
Comment has provided an overview of solitary confinement, the
psychological impact of isolation, and the issues presented by a typical
constitutional challenge to solitary confinement conditions under the
Eighth Amendment. It has also argued that the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act currently provide additional, and in some respects,
stronger protections than the Constitution for mentally ill inmates in
solitary confinement. Lastly, it has demonstrated that these protections
extend in three distinct situations: when inmates are segregated because
of their mental illness; when their isolation is prolonged on the basis of
mental illness; and when correctional facilities fail to provide isolated,
mentally ill inmates equal access to aids, benefits, or services provided
to the general prison population. Recognizing that these common prison
practices constitute discrimination under the disability rights statutes will
provide a much-needed remedy for mentally ill inmates who continue to
languish in our nation’s solitary confinement cells.

420. Alex Hannaford, Prison Guard Union Calls on Texas to Curtail Solitary Confinement on
Death Row, TEX. OBSERVER (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.texasobserver.org/texas-prison-guardunion-calls-curtailment-solitary-confinement-death-row/.

